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THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION: WHY "LOCAL RULES"
STILL MATTER AND MAY MATTER EVEN MORE IN THE FUTURE
MICHAEL L. BUENGER*
I. OVERVIEW
On January 1, 2012, the European Union ("EU") extended its Emission
Trading System ("ETS")' to a significant part of the global aviation sector2
notwithstanding the protests of numerous states 3 and objections from some
European businesses.4 With limited exception, aircraft departing from or landing
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Brussels School of International Studies, and Fredrik Erixon of the European Center for International
Political Economy for their helpful thoughts and comments.
** The Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expresses no opinion as to the accuracy of this
article's Chinese language sources, with regard to citations, references, and translation.
1. See Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 Oct. 2003
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community and
Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 34 [hereinafter ETS Directive].
2. Directive 2008/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 Nov. 2008
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3, 3 [hereinafter Aviation
Directive].
3. See, e.g., James Kanter, U.S. Airlines Challenge European Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES (July
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/business/global/04emissions.html; Manisha Singhal &
Anindya Upadhyay, India to Oppose EU's Emission Trading System for Airlines, THE ECON. TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2011, 4:17 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-08-01/news/29838536_1
carbon-di33oxide-emission-trading-system-indian-carriers; BLOOMBERG NEWS, China Bans Airlines
From Joining EU Carbon Levies System, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2012, 3:23 AM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-02-06/china-bans-airlines-from-joining-european-union-s-carbon-emissions-system.ht
ml; Carbon-Emission Trading for Aeroflot Could Be Prohibited, THE Moscow TIMES (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/carbon-emission-trading-for-aeroflot-could-be-prohib
ited/453458.html; Canada's Transport Minister Firm on Stance Regarding Aviation and Maritime
Emissions With the European Commission's Vice-President Responsible for Transport, CAN.
NEWSWIRE (May 3, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.newswire.calen/story/967261/canada-s-transport-min
ister-firm-on-stance-regarding-aviation-and-maritime-emissions-with-the-european-commission-s-vice-
president-responsible-for-tra.
4. See, e.g., BLOOMBERG NEWS, European Airlines and Airbus Seek to Ease Emissions Rule,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/13/business/global/airbus-and-european
-airlines-seek-deal-on-emissions.html (noting that Airbus and several European airlines urge the EU to
compromise on aviation ETS). The requirement that airlines surrender carbon allowance for 2012
emissions was to be effective April 30, 2013. See Aviation Directive, supra note 2, paras. 10(b)-(c), 14.
However, in November 2012 the European Commission proposed deferring the application of the ETS
to flights in and out of Europe until after the International Civil Aviation Organisation ("ICAO")
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at an aerodrome in an EU Member State, regardless of the state of registry, origin
of flight, or actual time spent in EU airspace, will be subject to the ETS for the
entire length of the flight.' This has become known as the "Aviation Directive"
and represents a considerable step in the EU's efforts to promote its robust climate
change agenda, efforts that are marked as much by unilateralism and
extraterritoriality6 as they are by multilateral engagement.7  The EU's unilateral
extension of its municipal law8 to the global aviation sector is unprecedented only
General Assembly in autumn 2013. See Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the
Council Derogating Temporarily from Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the
Community, COM (2012) 697 proposal (Nov. 9, 2012). If the ICAO fails to reach agreement on a
greenhouse gas ("GHG") emission reduction scheme the EU will enforce its ETS. See Memorandum
from the European Comm'n, Stopping the Clock of ETS and Aviation Emissions Following Last
Week's Int'l Civil Aviation Org. (ICAO) Council (Nov. 12, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseMEMO-12-854en.htm. However, recent developments evidenced
by the virtual collapse of European carbon prices and the European Parliament's refusal to intervene by
approving a "back-loading" price support scheme may necessitate substantial changes to the ETS. See
Carbon Trading ETS, RIP? THE EcONOMIST (Apr. 20, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com
/news/finance-and-economics/21576388-failure-reform-europes-carbon-market-will-reverberate-round-
world-ets.
5. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, Annex I. The directive applies to the bulk of international
and EU passenger and cargo air traffic that depart from or arrive at an aerodrome in a Member State.
Exempt activities include: (1) flights performed on an official mission of a reigning Monarch, the
immediate family, Heads of State, Heads of Government and Government Ministers of a country other
than a Member State; (2) military, customs and police flights; (3) search and rescue, firefighting,
humanitarian and emergency medical service flights; (4) flights performed exclusively under visual
flight rules as defined in Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention; (5) flights terminating at the aerodrome
from which the aircraft has taken off and during which no intermediate landing has been made; (6)
training flights performed for the purpose of obtaining a license or a rating provided that the flight does
not serve for the transport of passengers and/or cargo or for the positioning or ferrying of aircraft; (7)
flights performed for the purpose of scientific research or checking, testing or certifying aircraft or
equipment whether airborne or ground-based; (8) flights performed by aircraft with a certified
maximum take-off mass of less than 5,700 kg; (9) flights performed in the framework of public service
obligations imposed in accordance with Regulation (EEC) No 2408/92 on routes within outermost
regions or on routes where the capacity offered does not exceed 30,000 seats per year; and (10) flights
performed by a commercial air transport operator operating either (a) fewer than 243 flights per period
for three consecutive four-month periods, or (b) flights with total annual emissions lower than 10,000
tons per year.
6. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Shane, Under Sec'y for Policy, U.S. Dept. of Transp., Address at the
American Bar Association Forum on Air & Space Law (Oct. 4, 2007), in INTERACTIVE INTELLIGENCE
(Oct. 8, 2007), http://callcenterinfo.tmcnet.com/news/2007/10/08/2996105.htm (noting that forty-two of
the delegations comprising the EU and European Civil Aviation Conference entered a formal
reservation to the 2007 ICAO resolution calling on members to refrain from imposing market-based
measures on other members absent consent). See also Joanne Scott & Lavanya Rajamani, EU Climate
Change Unilateralism, 23 EUR. J. INT'L L. 469,475-76 (2012).
7. See generally Elisa Morgera, Ambition, Complexity and Legitimacy of Pursuing Mutual
Supportiveness Through the EU's External Environmental Action (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law
Research Paper Series, No. 2012/02,2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1987055.
8. Classifying EU rules as "municipal law" may not be entirely accurate given that its rules
arguably occupy a space somewhere between purely "international" and purely "municipal" law. See,
e.g., Case C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat Int'l Found. v. Council of the European
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in scale, not in originality, as other states have acted similarly in other areas of
legal life.9 The ETS has, however, become one of the more aggressive and
controversial examples of the unilateral use of municipal lawmaking power to
affect a wide-range of activities, peoples, and states across the globe. The rationale
for the EU's action is best summed up in the remarks of Climate Commissioner
Connie Hedegaard:
So I agree that we cannot now afford to sit in Europe and just wait for
whatever comes next in the international negotiations. That is of course
precisely why, over the past [eighteen] months or two years, the
Commission has come up with a communication on how to move our
targets, with our low-carbon roadmap and the energy roadmap; has
proposed an energy efficiency directive; has come up with substantial
Multiannual Financial Framework proposals with a substantial climate,
environment, energy-efficiency and resource-efficiency component; has
come up with a proposal on energy taxation; and has come up, as
requested, with tasks and values.... This is very much proof that we in
the Commission do not think we should sit idly waiting for the big
international agreement. We must continue to move forward in
Europe.'0
As Commissioner Hedegaard's statement demonstrates, attitudes towards the
meaning of the state, the concept of sovereignty," and the traditional mechanisms
Union, Opinion of Advocate General Poieras Maduro, % 21-22, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351(noting that the
EU Treaty "created a municipal legal order of trans-national dimensions."). In this article the term
"municipal law" includes EU rules and regulations for ease of distinction. For a general discussion on
the nature of the EU lawmaking process, see JOHN MCCORMICK, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 71-75 (2001). This rather simple distinction between international law and municipal
law as used in this article does not seek to address the more vexing issue of where on the legal spectrum
law promulgated by institutions such as the EU should rest.
9. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]; The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12, Acts of Parliament,
2003, as amended by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 (India); Marine Mammals Protection
Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972); Amendment VIII to the Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Feb. 25, 2011,
effective May 1, 2011) arts. 20, 29, 107,164, http://www.high-time.cn/eng/chubshow.asp?bbb=20
110513154257&proid=20110520103322 (China). See also Charles W. Smitherman III, The Future of
Global Competition Governance: Lessons from the Transatlantic, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 769, 818-
820 (2004) (discussing extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU competition law). But see Appellate Body
Report, United States - Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products, W 1-3, WT/DS38l/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Tuna-Dolphin
(2012)] (holding, in part, that U.S. "dolphin-safe" labeling provisions are inconsistent with TBT
Agreement Article 2.1).
10. Remarks of Ms. Connie Hedegaard, 2012 O.J. 122 (Jan. 18, 2012) (European Parliament
debates) (emphasis added).
11. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11-22 (1999). Krasner
identifies four types of sovereignty: (1) domestic sovereignty referring to internal organization and
effectiveness of state authority; (2) interdependent sovereignty referring to the loss of sovereignty when
states cannot control movements of goods and ideas; (3) international legal sovereignty as juridical
equality; and (4) Westphalian sovereignty referring to principles of non-interference in internal affairs.
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of international lawmaking are undergoing dynamic changes.' 2 The advent of the
United Nations,13 the wide acceptance of human rights,14 the use of powerful
trading agreements to break down national barriers," the globalization of judicial
power,' 6 the rise of institutions such as the EU, the World Trade Organization
("WTO")17 and non-state actors,' 8 multinational humanitarian interventions,19 the
formulation of jus cogens principles, 20 and the increasing use of market-based
See also Case C-154/11, Mahamdia v. Algeria, Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, It 1-3 (May
24, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:6201 ICCO154
:EN:HTML (explaining that state immunity from jurisdiction of European Courts is relative and that
states are subject to jurisdiction in relation to their non-public functions such as employee relations).
12. See generally Andrew Halpin & Volker Roeben, Introduction, in THEORISING THE GLOBAL
LEGAL ORDER 1-8 (Andrew Halpin & Volker Roeben, eds. 2009). See also Eric C. Ip, Globalization
and the Future of the Law of the Sovereign State, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 636, 641 (2010); David
Dyzenhaus, Positivism and the Pesky Sovereign, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 363, 364 (2011).
13. U.N. Charter art. 1.
14. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(II1) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Dec.
10 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987); Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered
into force Jan. 12, 1951).
15. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct, 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
16. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. See also C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder, The Global Expansion of
Judicial Power: The Judicialization of Politics, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1-10
(C. Neal Tate & Torbjtm Vallinder, eds. 1995); Gary Born, A New Generation of International
Adjudication, 61 DUKE L. J. 775, 782-783 (2012).
17. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]; Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, July 27, 1957, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; International Civil Aviation Organization, Chicago Convention
on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention];
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, 289 U.N.T.S. 48.
18. See e.g., Steven Bernstein & Erin Hannah, Non-State Global Standard Setting and the WTO:
Legitimacy and the Need for Regulatory Space, 11 J. INT'L ECON. L. 575, 576 (2008) (explaining that
"[i]nstitutionally [non-state actors] are notable for establishing their own governing systems, largely
independent of state governments, with regulatory capacity to back up those obligations with
enforceable rules. Scholars in law, political science, and business have variously labeled them
'transnational regulatory systems,' 'non-state market driven' ("NSMD") governance systems, and 'civil
regulation' . . . . The goal for many NSMD governance systems is not simply to create niche markets
that apply their standards, but to promote their standards as appropriate and legitimate across an entire
market sector." (emphasis added)).
19. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/l 199 (Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1319, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1319 (Sept. 20, 2000); S.C. Res. 1509, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 (Sept. 19, 2003); S.C. Res. 1590,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005); S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011); S.C.
Res. 1976, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 2048, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2048 (May 18,
2012).
20. See Paul B. Stephan, The Political Economy of Jus Cogens, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1073,
1074 (2011) ("In the last two decades, abhorrence of impunity has migrated to the concept of jus
VOL. 41: 3420
THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION
measures ("MBMs") to regulate transnational conduct 21 represent emerging forces
that challenge the very foundations of the public international law order. Andrew
Halpin and Volker Roeben note that, "The broader canvas of globalisation extends
greater artistic license to the legal imagination. In part, this is a matter of
opportunity. In part, this is a matter of need."22 The artistic license afforded by
rapid globalization has not only affected the types of relationships and behaviors to
be regulated, i.e., subjects and subject matters, but perhaps more importantly who
decides such issues and in what breadth.
This article examines the EU's extension of its ETS to the global aviation
sector as a compelling example of how the most influential states or blocs of states
(hereinafter "states" 23) use their municipal lawmaking powers to manage behavior
well beyond their borders.24 Part I presents some context and examines the ETS,
its application to the global aviation sector, and the Court of Justice of the
European Union's ("ECJ") analysis of its legality under its view of current
principles of international law. Part II discusses the Aviation Directive as an
example of the quiet rise of municipal law as a transnational regulatory mechanism
that exists independently and apart from traditional multilateral international
lawmaking. The Aviation Directive demonstrates that while the last sixty years
has witnessed the rise of varied multilateral institutions and efforts, transnational
problems can incentivize powerful states to use their municipal lawmaking
cogens."); Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court: A Liberal
Defence, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 765, 780 (2006). But see, A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the
Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 32-40
(1995) (discussing the two theories of jus cogens, their origins, similarities and differences); Robert
Barnidge, Jr., Questioning the Legitimacy of Jus Cogens in the Global Legal Order, 38 ISRAEL Y.B. ON
H.R. 199, 204 (2008) (". . .description can have the effect of 'de-binding' engagements with jus cogens
from what might otherwise be considered the erstwhile formal textual constraints of article 53.").
21. See Stefan Speck, The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based Energy Taxes in European
Countries, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 31-32 (2008) (noting that Europe's increasing reliance on market-
based measures began in the 1990s).
22. Halpin & Roeben, supra note 12, at 5.
23. It is important to clarify that the EU is not a state as that term is now understood in
international law. Rather, the EU is an entity with separate international legal personality. See Treaty of
Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
art. 46A, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty] ("The Union shall have legal
personality."). The EU's legal personality includes (1) an ability to enter into agreements with other
states or international organizations and (2) a private legal personality ("legal capacity") that permits
the EU to be a party in private legal matters. See Stephen C. Sieberson, Did Symbolism Sink the
Constitution? Reflections on the European Union's State-Like Attributes, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
PoL'Y 1, 18, 19 (2007) (describing states as having "personalities" in the international legal
community). Although not technically a state, for ease of use in this article the term "state" is used not
only to include the EU given its unique international standing, but also its significant independent
legislative and regulatory powers that extend beyond issues normally associated with merely a trading
bloc.
24. Sometimes others seek to extend municipal law to regulate transnational conduct even in the
face of state resistance to such an extension. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-
1491, slip op. (U.S. April 17, 2013) (seeking to extend the jurisdiction of U.S. courts using the Alien
Tort Statute for human rights violations allegedly committed by Shell Oil in the Niger River delta).
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machinery aggressively to confront cross-border problems. This takes place even
when the international community's conventional lawmaking tools fail to achieve
desired results or prove too inexpedient.25
II. THE EU's AVIATION EMISSION TRADING SYSTEM
Both the authority and the source of public international law are challenged
by global forces that raise new questions regarding what exactly constitutes the
parameters of the "public," the "international" and the "law" aspects of the
26system. The public international law system is, in theory, premised on the notion
of multilateral legal coordination of transnational state action; that is, consent to
coordinating frameworks, such as formal treaties or generally accepted state
practices, as the mechanism for regulating state and global conduct.27 The
normative hierarchy articulated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice
largely reflects a predisposition towards both the sanctity of the state as the prime
25. See Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of
Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 90 (2006) ("International environmental law has not, however,
trumped the need for extraterritorial application of U.S. laws to protect the environment. If anything, the
need for extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental laws is greater now than ever before.
Application of U.S. environmental laws beyond its territorial boundaries under appropriate
circumstances can be an indispensable weapon in fulfilling the goal of meaningful environmental
protection on a global scale." (emphasis added)). See also Craig James Willy, In Defense of Green
Protectionism: Why the EU Should Put the Planet Before Free Trade, FUTURECHALLENGES (Apr. 21,
2012), http://futurechallenges.org/local/in-defense-of-green-protectionism-why-the-eu-should-put-the-
planet-before-free-trade ("The question for environmentalists is: When there is no agreement
forthcoming, is there any real alternative to green protectionism?").
26. One question the international law community has struggled with is whether there is actually a
clearly identifiable normative system that can be called international law. See, e.g., Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1003 (1998) (noting that
dualists distinguished sharply between public international law as the law of relations between states,
mocked by John Austin, as not really "law," and private international law as the law governing persons,
mocked by Austin as not really "international" although it was "law"). See also Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2601 (1997) (discussing the various
historical theories of compliance).
27. State practice or customary law arises from giving certain legal character to the perceived and
generally accepted practices of sovereign states. See Jun-shik Hwang, A Sense and Sensibility of Legal
Obligation: Customary International Law and Game Theory, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 111, 119
(2006). However, what exactly constitutes accepted custom is a fluid question. As the International
Court of Justice has observed, the period of time over which a practice or custom forms does not alone
determine whether it can be considered international law. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf
(Ger./Den. v. Ger./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 74 (Feb. 20) (noting that "the passage of only a short period
of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international
law."). See also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 115,
157-59 (2005) (discussing the concept of "instant" custom as a possible source of international law).
Customary international law has an additional problem. While it is generally accepted that states may
withdraw from treaties, the conventional thinking is that states may not withdraw from a rule of
customary international law once accepted even if the state objects. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu
Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 204 (2010).
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actor in international law and the necessity of its consent to regulation.28 Yet this
normative hierarchy of how the system is supposed to work has always been
somewhat dubious because the creation and implementation of the international
legal order is an inherently chaotic business-a contact sport if you will-
comprised of many players operating from different motivations, frequently
seeking different outcomes, promoting different concepts, complying for different
reasons, and using different language with only marginal refereeing. 29 This is most
certainly true today despite the emergence of institutions designed to more
effectively broker international behavior over a vast array of subjects. The effects
of globalization and economic integration have not only led to a broadening of
political power across states, but have accelerated the growth of substantial
connections between individual behavior in one state and its impact in another.
Thus, notwithstanding debates on the exact economic effects of globalization, 3 0 it
is evident that the political and legal order of the last sixty years is being dislodged
and replaced by various modalities of transnational regulation and that there are
various actors engaged in the regulatory enterprise.
In understanding the impact of these developments and what they may mean
for the future of public international law as a system, it is necessary to step back
from formalistic definitions and categories, (e.g. municipal law versus international
law, positivism versus natural law theory) and consider the question of what
constitutes international law from a more pragmatic relational, behavioral and
functional perspective-that is, what peoples, relationships, institutions and
activities are being regulated, by whom, and how legitimate and successful is the
regulatory effort. The legitimacy of any regulatory enterprise is hugely dependent
upon its successful implementation. As will be discussed, the globe's most
influential states have significant reserves of economic and political power
available that can be deployed to promote success and therefore add legitimacy to
28. Traditionally scholars have pointed to the Statute of the International Court of Justice as
defining the sources of international law. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26,
1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. According to Article 38, international law is comprised of (1) international
conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
states; (2) custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; and (4) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations. Some question whether this
view on the sources of international law is relevant today. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Gallant, International
Criminal Courts and the Making of Public International Law: New Roles for International
Organizations and Individuals, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 603, 606 (2010) (noting that states contribute
to the formation of international law); Andreas Buss, The Preah Vihear Case and Regional Customary
Law, 9 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 111, 126 (2010) (discussing calls to amend the statute to address its overly
positivistic tone). See also Duncan B. Hollis, Why State Consent Still Matters - Non-State Actors,
Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law, 23 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 137, 145 (2005)
(recognizing that consent from states contributes to the creation of international law).
29. Guglielmo Verdirame, "The Divided West": International Lawyers in Europe and America,
18 EuR. J. INT'L L. 553, 562 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Ruchir Sharma, Broken BRICs, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov./Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138219/ruchir-sharma/broken-brics (arguing that international
economic convergence is a myth).
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their regulatory efforts, formal categories of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
When examined from this more pragmatic viewpoint, therefore, it is clear that
formal treaties and recognized customs are not the only legal mechanisms by
which states shape global behavior. Law does not act upon institutions and
individuals in a vacuum. Accordingly, while the study of public international law
has tended to reflect an almost hypertensive concern for categorical subject matter
"fragmentation,"31 the real story in international law today is the extent to which
conventional normative mechanisms of international lawmaking, e.g., treaties and
state custom, are being augmented if not displaced by a rapidly growing list of
unconventional normative mechanisms, e.g., non-state regulators, MBMs, and the
extraterritorial application of municipal law.
The Aviation Directive is a case study in this latter development. It illustrates
that states, particularly the most powerful and influential states, 32 have a variety of
legal tools available outside of conventional international lawmaking by which to
regulate and shape global behavior, not the least of which is giving transnational
effect to their municipal laws premised upon the notion of substantial
connectedness.33 Extending the ETS to the global aviation sector cannot be seen
simply as an act of regulating the activities of a particular industry with
commercial ties to the EU. It is, rather, an attempt to reshape global behavior34
31. For a discussion concerning the "fragmentation" of public international law, see Int'l Law
Comm'n, 58th Sess., May 9-June 9, 2006, and Jul. 3-Aug. 11, 2006, Rep. of the Study Group of the
Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification
and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006) (finalized by Martti
Koskenniemi), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english /a cn4 1682.pdf. See also
David Kennedy, International Law: One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism and the
Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 641, 641 (2007) ("Over the last few years,
innumerable scholars have turned their attention to the fragmentation, disaggregation, and multiplicity
of the international legal regime."). While the "fragmentation" problem may be of great concern to
academics, this has hardly stopped the development of new legal regimes. The challenge facing
international law, as evidenced by the Aviation Directive, is not subject matter fragmentation but rather
the fact that it is the product of a segmented society; that is, a social structure (the international
community) lacking a strong central authority to coordinate the development and enforcement of law
and one whose actors place a premium on maintaining their sovereignty and autonomy. As a result,
there is a constant push and pull between the center of the global legal system evidenced in such
institutions as the U.N., WTO and ICJ, and the interests of the system's segments (states) to collaborate
in solving common problems but not at the expense of their autonomy.
32. See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, Transnational Competition Law and the WTO, 5 J. INT'L TRADE L.
& POL'Y 42, 46 (2006) (noting more developed economies have sufficient market "clout" to unilaterally
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction in a meaningful way but smaller economies can rarely expect to make
a plausible threat to prohibit conduct by large firms that might have negative effects within their
borders).
33. One question that remains relatively unresolved is what exactly do we mean by
"transnational" and "international" law? Vicki Jackson, for example, speaks of transnational law as both
international law and the laws of foreign countries. See generally VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 1-2 (2010).
34. For example, according to 2011 figures provided by Heathrow Airport alone, 22.8 percent of
69.4 million, or 15,823,200, passengers departing or landing were on North American-oriented flights.
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while protecting domestic interests by giving extraterritorial effect to what Dan
Danielsen calls "local rules," 3 5 in spite of protests to the contrary. 36  Does this
mean that the sanctity of state is becoming irrelevant?37 Hardly.3 1 It does suggest,
however, that as interdependencies and connections between states and individuals
grow, solely formalistic notions of international law and conventional modes of
international lawmaking will not define the regulation of transnational conduct.3 9
Rather, pluralism, non-state action, extraterritoriality, and unilateralism are
becoming as much a part of the globe's legal frameworks as is traditional
multilateralism. 40 This may be an unnerving development for an international law
purist seeking clean divides between "public," "private," "international," and
About Heathrow Airport, HEATHROW, http://www.heathrowairport.com/about-us/facts-and-figures (last
visited Mar. 4,2012).
35. Dan Danielsen, Local Rules and a Global Economy: An Economic Policy Perspective, 1
TRANSN'L LEGAL THEORY 49, 49-50 (2010). See also Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. and
Others v. Sec'y of State for Energy and Climate Change, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, 1 147
(2011) [hereinafter Air Transport Case], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.js
f?text=&docid=l 10742&pagelndex=0&doclang-EN&mode=req&dir-&occ=first&part-l&cid=55150
("Admittedly, it is undoubtedly true that, to some extent, account is thus taken of events that take place
over the high seas or on the territory of third countries. This might indirectly give airlines an incentive
to conduct themselves in a particular way when flying over the high seas or on the territory of third
countries, in particular to consume as little fuel as possible and expel as few greenhouse gases as
possible."). See also Nico KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST STRUCTURE OF
POSTNATIONAL LAw 4 (2010) ("The classical distinction between the domestic and intemational
spheres that had sustained them is increasingly blurred, with a multitude of formal and informal
connections taking the place of what once were relatively clear rules and categories.").
36. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 156 ("Contrary to the view taken by the
claimants in the main proceedings and the associations supporting them, Directive 2008/101 does not,
either in law or in fact, preclude third countries from bringing into effect or applying their own
emissions trading schemes for aviation activities.").
37. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 15, WT/DSI 1/8/AB
/R (Oct. 4, 1996) (noting that the WTO Agreement is a contract and a self-evident exercise of sovereign
power in pursuit of national interests).
38. See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 22 (2001) (noting that the "nation-state remains of supreme
importance"). See also DAVID J. BEDERMAN, GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 147-50
(2008) (noting that the Westphalian model of the nation-state is tested but it has not collapsed or been
rendered irrelevant).
39. See, e.g., Austen L. Parrish, Domestic Responses to Transnational Crime: The Limits of
National Law, 23 CRIM. L.F. 275, 289-90 (2012) (discussing the growth of transnational crime and the
increased use of municipal law, but challenging the desirability of this development); Jay Ellis,
Extraterritorial Exercise of Jurisdiction for Environmental Protection: Addressing Fairness Concerns,
25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 397, 407 (2012) (observing that there are reasons to believe that unilateral
exercises of extraterritorial authority may become more common); Shohit Chaudhry & Kartikey
Mahaj an, The Case for an Effective Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Competition Commission of India in
Light of International Practices, 32 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 314, 314 (2011) (describing the role of
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Competition Commission of India and the need to enforce such
jurisdiction more effectively).
40. See KRISCH, supra note 35, at 4 (describing law and politics as having been "transformed").
See also David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 7, 10
(". . . interdependence is a fact, sovereignty a relic.").
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"municipal," but it is a real and largely uncoordinated development nonetheless-
one that is difficult to categorize and even harder to contain.
It is always dangerous to use a single event as a general indicator of future
happenings. However, as Commissioner Hedegaard's statement evidences, global
interdependencies and transnational problems are accelerating the need for
coordinated action at the very moment the international community's ability to
reach consensus-driven solutions in several critical areas languishes. 41 In response,
the EU has chosen to push the "international community," whoever that may be at
any one moment in time, into addressing problems such as climate change by
unilaterally imposing its ETS on much of the global aviation sector, with all
indications that it will not stop there.42 The mere act of landing or departing from
an aerodrome in a Member State now subjects a non-exempt aircraft and its owner
(and therefore tangentially its passengers and/or cargo recipients) to the "unlimited
jurisdiction" (i.e., global jurisdiction) of the EU for purposes of aviation emissions
from the beginning to the end of the flight regardless of origin, destination or
duration.43 A public international legal order that was, in theory, premised on
41. See, e.g., Carlyle A. Thayer, Standoff in the South China Sea, YALEGLOBAL (June 12, 2012),
available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edulcontent/standoff-south-china-sea (discussing China and the
Philippines both laying claim to the same islands); Dead Man Talking, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 28,
2011), available at http://www.economist.com/node/18620814 (noting the challenges first world
countries are facing in negotiating with countries on the economic rise); Colum Lynch, Russia, China
Veto Syria Resolution at the United Nations, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russia-china-block-syria-resolution-at-
un/2011/10/04/gIQArCFBML story.html (describing Russia and China standing up to the U.S. with
regards to a Syrian resolution before the UN Security Council); Canada to Withdraw from Kyoto
Protocol, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
16151310 (describing Canada's withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol); Noel Brinkerhoff, Why Does the
U.S. Refuse to Ratify the Hazardous Waste Treaty?, ALLGov (Aug. 28, 2011), available at http://www.
allgov.com/USandtheWorld/ViewNews/Why Does the USRefuse to Ratify the Hazardous Wa
ste Treaty_110828 (pointing to the United States' lack of waste management and international
dumping).
42. See, e.g., Jeff Coelho, IMO to Discuss C02 Curbs for Ships, Industry Frets, REUTERS (Feb.
22, 2012), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/us-carbon-shipping-idUSTRE81LIK
N20120222 (noting that the EU ran out of patience in the ICAO and imposed its own aviation emission
standards and that EU is ready to act if the IMO fails to deliver on maritime emissions). See also
JASPER FABER ET AL., TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN ACTION TO REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS FROM INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TRANSPORT 1 (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/cli
ma/policies/transport/shipping/docs/ghgships report en.pdf; SIMONE MANFREDI ET AL., PRODUCT
ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT (PEF) GUIDE 1 (July 17, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environm
ent/eussd/pdf/footprint/PEF%20methodology%2Ofinal%20draft.pdf
43. See Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 125. But see Brief of the Federal Republic of
Germany as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
98 (2012) (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 379578, at *3.4 (explaining that the U.S. assertion of universal
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under the Alien Tort Statute should only be available if plaintiffs
show no legal remedy available in country of incorporation or center of management); Brief of the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and The Kingdom of the
Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 98 (2012), (No. 10-1491), 2012 WL 405480, at *2 (explaining that there exists continued
426 VOL. 41: 3
THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION
respect for the symmetric horizontal relationships of sovereign equals is being
displaced by complex, asymmetric relationships where influential states and
multiple actors use their regulatory powers to augment, provoke or even
circumvent multilateral efforts aimed at shaping global behavior." As a
consequence, traditional conceptual curbs on a state's ability to overreach-for
example, freedom from external control, and even the very nature of state authority
or, exclusive sovereignty over a defined population within a given geographical
territory-are becoming both ambiguous and less effective.45 There has never
been any question concerning the authority of a state to regulate relationships and
behaviors within its borders regardless of an individual's citizenship, save that of
diplomats. But increasingly more influential states seek to regulate the behavior of
individuals with substantial connections to territory, economy or politics regardless
of their actual physical location on the planet. Globalization has effectively
created a virtual world for the political and regulatory powers of the most
influential states, encouraging them to see an ever broadening array of connections
between extraterritorial conduct and domestic interests that rationalize the greater
use of municipal law in response.46
recognition of the principle that broad assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction arising out of aliens'
claims against foreign defendants for alleged injuries in foreign jurisdictions should be avoided).
44. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 129 ("Furthermore, the fact that ... certain
matters contributing to the pollution of the air, sea or land territory of the Member State originate in an
event which occurs partly outside that territory is not such as to call into question . . . the full
applicability of European Union law in that territory." (Citations Omitted)).
45. Traditionally, the four attributes of the state were (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined
territory, (3) a functioning government exercising authority over its population and territory, and (4)
independence. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-72 (7th ed. 2008).
46. Nicolas van de Walle notes that one potential consequence of globalization is the
"marketization" of public policy and public institutions through liberalization, privatization and
deregulation. Therefore, the globalization of the world's economy and the marketization of public
policy are distinctive but intertwined developments. See generally NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL STABILITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 5 (1998), available at
http://www.iatp.org/files/economicglobalization andpolitical stability.pdf. See also Case C-89/85,
A. AhIstrom Osakeyhtio v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (1988) (endorsing the extraterritorial
application of EU competition law); Brendan Sweeney, Reflections on a Decade of International Law:
International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress, 10 MELB. J. OF INT'L L. 58, 58 (2009)
(discussing both national and international developments in competition law); Bederman, supra note
38, at 27 ("For millennia, commerce has been the solvent of sovereignty. Throughout all epochs of
globalization ... international trade and all its attendant phenomena and consequences have been signal
contributors to the processes of political, social, and cultural change around the world. Indeed, we tend
to regard globalization as, first and foremost, a set of economic processes that bind international actors
(States, individuals, corporations, and other polities) together in a web of mutual interdependence ....
Commerce is subversive of established State and political order precisely because it allows for the free
communication and transport of people, goods, services, and information across recognized national
boundaries and cultural zones of influence. Throughout much of human history, the peoples of
radically different cultures, ethnicities, religious traditions, and imperial regimes have nonetheless
sought to trade with each other and to proposer from the consequent economic benefits that accrue from
such economic interaction."); Pascal Lamy, The Place of the WTO and its Law in the International
Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 969, 969 (2006) (stating that trade is at the heart of many segments of
public international law).
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The Aviation Directive, therefore, is one of several illustrations of the impact
that globalization is having on the development of international law, modes of
international lawmaking, and the process by which the most influential states
identify and confront global issues, sometimes using their municipal law systems
as a principal response tool to perceived threats or transnational problems. With
the language of integration infused into virtually every discussion concerning the
globe's legal systems, the degree to which the most influential states use their
municipal authority to shape global behavior is an often overlooked but profoundly
important theme.47 It is an undertow sometimes working with and sometimes
against conventional structures of public international law and multilateralism.
With the emergence of the rule of law culture over the last sixty years,48 the
extraterritorial application of municipal law can become a surrogate means by
which the most influential states advance their many objectives. 49 Through law
these states are capable of projecting their values, policies and power globally
while protecting their domestic interests by wrapping them in a blanket of law that
can often go unchallenged5 0 because of the absence of super-national law
enforcement institutions capable of meaningfully containing state adventurism.5 1
A. Environmental and Economic Policy in the EU-Greening the Planet,
Green Protectionism or Both?
James Carville, the noted strategist for Bill Clinton's successful 1992
presidential campaign, famously coined the phrase, "It's the economy, stupid."
The linkage between a state's economy and its many other systems-including its
47. See, e.g., Commission Decision of 24 May 2004 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Article
82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement against Microsoft Corporation, Case
COMP/C-3/37.792 - Microsoft, 2007 O.J. L32/23 (2007), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:032:0024:0024:EN:PDF (ordering Microsoft to disclose certain
software information to competitors).
48. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY I
(2004). See also Julio Faundez & Ronald Janse, Rule of Law Promotion and Security Sector Reform:
Partners or Rivals?, 4 HAGUE J. RULE L. 1, 1-3 (2012), available at http://joumals.cambridge.org/actio
n/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8519803; Otto Triffterer, Closing Remarks and a Vision:
International Criminal Justice and the "Well-Being of the World," 22 CRIM. L.F. 531, 536-37 (2011).
49. Cf Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, Using Trade Sanctions and Subsidies to Achieve Environmental
Objectives in the Pacific Rim, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 296, 297-98 (1993) (explaining that,
similarly, international law may be used as a means of advancing environmental objectives outside of a
state's borders).
50. Cf Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471-74 (2012) [hereinafter FACTA]
(requires foreign banks to locate American account holders and disclose their balances, receipts, and
withdrawals to the Internal Revenue Service or be subject to a thirty percent withholding tax on income
from U.S. financial assets held by the banks).
51. See e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Essay in Honor of W. Michael Reisman: Trade, Investment and
Dispute Settlement: The Enforcement of WTO Judgments, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 558, 562 (2009) ("[T]he
WTO dispute system has been effective because there is an expectation that decisions will ultimately be
complied with."). But see Born, supra note 16 (arguing that so-called second generation international
adjudicatory bodies have far more enforcement powers than first generation bodies, such as the
International Court of Justice).
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legal system-is inseparable. Anti-trust and competition law is premised on the
idea that the diffusion of commercial power is far better for a community than
monopolism.52 Parochial trade laws of the 1920's and 1930's intended to insulate
national markets from global economic forces became accelerants to the Great
Depression producing massive social and political dislocation.5 3 More recently,
the widespread integration of the world's economies has spurred new regulatory
systems-both state and non-state driven-seeking to balance trade with other
considerations such as development, the environment, labor rights, and natural
resources exploitation.54 Economics is, in short, one of the foremost imperatives
behind a state's political, social, and legal order, as well as largely defining a
state's capacity to affect events across the planet. Accordingly, the architecture of
the global economy is not only undergirded by a complex system of international
and regional treaties, customary law, and emerging non-state regulation, it is also
influenced by municipal laws with significant extraterritorial reach. The
globalization of a state's economy has, in some cases, encouraged and even
hastened the need to globalize a state's municipal law.
Over the last forty years, economics and the environment have become
intertwined as states and the international community recognize the impact human
activity has on transnational ecosystems and international relations. This impact is
not always empirically quantifiable leading at times to sharp disagreements over
just how much influence environmental considerations should have on economic
activity.5 5  The result is virtual combat in some states between environmental
56considerations and economic development. Such conflict is nothing new. But
52. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38 (2012); Council Regulation (EC) No.
411/2004 of 26 February 2004 Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87 and Amending Regulations
(EEC) No. 3976/87 and (EC) No. 1/2003, in Connection with Air Transport Between the Community
and Third Countries, 2004 O.J. (L 68) 1. See also David J. Gerber & Paolo Cassinis, The
"Modernization" of European Community Competition Law: Achieving Consistency in Enforcement:
Part 1, 27 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 10, 10-11 (2006); Heike Schweitzer, Competition Law and
Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship: The Example of Art. 81, 81 (Euro. Univ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2007/30, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1092883.
53. Brendan Ruddy, The Critical Success of the WTO: Trade Policies of the Current Economic
Crisis, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 475, 475-77 (2010) (explaining that trade protectionism exacerbated the
Great Depression); Alan 0. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative
Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 473, 474 (2010) ("[T]he Great Depression taught the world that
protective policies can quickly and destructively spread from nation to nation.").
54. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 17. See also Case C-337/09 P, Council v.
Zhejiang Xinan Chem. Indus. Grp. Co. Ltd., 2012 EUR-Lex (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://curia.eu
ropa.eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage=en&num=C-337/09%20P# (discussing what constitutes a state
controlled company from a non-market economy for purposes of applying anti-dumping rules).
55. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504, 511 (2007) (discussing issues surrounding
the power of the U.S. EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
56. See, e.g., Lucy Madison, House Republicans Reject Climate Change Science, CBSNEWS,
(Mar. 16, 2011, 2:38 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20043909-
503544.html. See also Richard Balme, The Politics of Environmental Justice in China 1 (Am. Political
Sci. Assoc. 2011 Annual Meeting, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1901849. See, e.g., Alan
B. Sielen, Time for a Department of the Environment, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 435, 463 (2011)
(explaining that the failure of the U.S. to establish a cabinet level environment department contributes
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the emergence of truly global ecological problems,57 spurred in part by demands
for more robust worldwide economic growth,58 is compelling some states to take a
more nuanced view of the competing interests, not simply to address transnational
problems but also to stimulate innovation and development at home. As Michael
E. Porter and Claas van der Linde have observed:
The relationship between environmental goals and industrial
competitiveness has normally been thought of as involving a tradeoff
between social benefits and private costs. The issue was how to balance
society's desire for environmental protection with the economic burden
on industry. Framed this way, environmental improvement becomes a
kind of arm-wrestling match. One side pushes for tougher standards; the
other side tries to beat the standards back.
Our central message is that the environment-competitiveness debate has
been framed incorrectly. The notion of an inevitable struggle between
ecology and the economy grows out of a static view of environmental
regulation, in which technology, products, processes and customer
needs are all fixed. In this static world, where firms have already made
their cost-minimizing choices, environmental regulation inevitably
raises costs and will tend to reduce the market share of domestic
companies on global markets.59
The application of the ETS to the global aviation sector may be seen as evidence of
the EU embracing the Porter/van der Linde proposition that the environment and
the economy are synergetic and therefore must be reciprocally regulated.60 From a
to a combative and not collaborative approach to finding solutions and allows industry to block
anything a particular industry does not find congenial to its interests).
57. See, e.g., Larry Cati Backer, From Moral Obligation to International Law: Disclosure
Systems, Markets and the Regulation of Multinational Corporations, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 591, 592-93
(2008) (describing the role of multinational firms in creating a flexible new governance-style set of
substantive obligations tracking "public" goals, reinforced by a hard international law regime of
monitoring and disclosure).
58. See, e.g., The Ilulissat Declaration, Arctic Ocean Conference, Greenland, May 27-29, 2008, 48
I.L.M. 362, available at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/IlulissatDeclaration.pdf. See, e.g.,
Tessa Mendez, Thin Ice, Shifting Geopolitics: The Legal Implications of Arctic Ice Melt, 38 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 527, 527-28 (2010) (geopolitics is tied to resource use and control; the Arctic as virgin
territory lacks geopolitical stability established in most other areas of the world). See also Cinnamon P.
Carlarne, Arctic Dreams and Geoengineering Wishes: The Collateral Damage of Climate Change, 49
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 602, 602-04 (2011).
59. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-
Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1995). See also Geoffrey Heal, A Celebration
ofEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 1 ENVT'L ECON. & POL'Y 7, 7 (2007).
60. See Valeria Costantini & Massimiliano Mazzanti, On the Green and Innovative Side of Trade
Competitiveness? The Impact of Environmental Policies and Innovation on EU Exports, 41 RESEARCH
POL'Y 132, 132 (2012) (explaining that EU energy tax policies and innovation efforts positively
influence export flow dynamics, revealing a Porter-like mechanism). See also Hans Vedder, The Treaty
ofLisbon and European Environmental Law and Policy, 22 J. ENVTL. L. 285, 286 (2010).
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purely regulatory perspective, 61 the U.S. has arguably reduced its international
environmental leadership footprint in response to domestic politics that often see
environmental and economic interests as opposing forces, 62 even placing itself at a
strategic disadvantage sometimes. In contrast, the EU has used its vast
regulatory power over the Common Market to drive its economies to progressively
incorporate environmental concerns as root considerations in commercial
policies.64 Whether this largely top-down approach 6 5-as distinguished from a
market-based approach 66-will prove effective in the long term as a means to
61. It is important to make a distinction between regulatory leadership and environmental impact.
As recent studies have shown, the shift of the U.S. to a greater use of natural gas has resulted in a
significant decline in GHG emissions as power companies switch from coal to generate electricity. This
is occurring even in the absence of regulatory-imposed emission reduction system. See Xi Lu, Jackson
Salovaara & Michael B. McElroy, Implications of the Recent Reductions in Natural Gas Prices for
Emissions of CO2 from the US Power Sector, 46 ENvTL. Scl. TECH. 3014, 3014 (2012). In contrast, the
EU's ETS, which is meant to drive down GHG emissions through regulation, has had a smaller impact
for a variety of reasons. See also European Environment Agency, Why Did Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Increase in the EUin 2010? 3 (Technical Report No. 3/2012, 2012), available at http://www.eea.euro
pa.eu/publications/european-union-greenhouse-gas-inventory-2012/why-did-greenhouse-gas-emissions
.pdf/view.
62. See, e.g., David Burwell, Keystone XL Pipeline, A Poster Child for Political Posturing,
CNNOPINION (May 30, 2012, 3:13 PM), available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/30/opinioniburwe
ll-keystone-pipeline/index.html?eref=rss_mostpopular. See also Jutta Brunn6e, The United States and
International Environmental Law: Living with an Elephant, 15 EuR. J. INT'L L. 617, 618-19 (2004);
Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer, Transatlantic Environmental Relations:
Implications for the Global Community, in TRANSATLANTIC ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY POLITICS:
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 251, 254-55 (Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin &
Stacy D. VanDeveer, eds., 2009).
63. See, e.g., John A. C. Cartner & Edgar Gold, Commentary in Reply to "Is it Time for the United
States to Join the Law of the Sea Convention, "42 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 49-50 (2011) (arguing that the
failure to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention places the U.S. at a significant disadvantage). Cf Sharon
E. Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition Laws Based Upon the European
Union Model, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 467, 467-68 (2001) (arguing that the EU has harmonized
competition laws and is influencing other states to adopt its model while the U.S. denies the feasibility
to do so, in turn enabling the EU to have greater influence in the development of global competition
law).
64. See Decision No. 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July
2002 Laying Down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, 2002 O.J. (L 242) 1. See
also Commission of the European Communities, Economic Growth and the Environment: Some
Implications for Economic Policy, at 7, COM (1994) 465 final (Mar. 11, 1994); Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Energy Roadmap 2050, at 1, COM (2011) 885/2 (Dec.
15, 2011); Naomi Salmon, What's Cooking? From GM Food to Nanofood: Regulating Risk and Trade
in Europe, 11 ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 97 (2009).
65. But see Adam Weiss, Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of Same-Sex Couples
in the United States and the European Union, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 81, 99 (2007) (arguing
that free movement of goods and peoples differ in the U.S. and EU with the former favoring a
centralized approach while the latter vacillates between centralization and competition).
66. Cf Gitanjali Deb, Atrazine: A Case Study in the Differences Between Regulations of
Endocrine Disrupting Chemicals in the EU and the US, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 173, 173,
186-87 (2006) (noting that while both the EU and U.S. have elements of precaution in their
environmental regulatory systems, the underlying drivers are very different).
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address ecological problems remains to be seen.67 Nevertheless, as Noah M. Sachs
notes, "[s]ince 2000, the EU has embarked on ambitious environmental lawmaking
in areas such as chemical regulation, energy efficiency, hazardous waste, and
climate change. Europe has in many cases supplanted the United States as the
leading originator and exporter of environmental law innovation." 68 The ETS is
evidence of the EU's effort to link environment well-being to the Common
Market's economic interests.69  As stated by the Ecologic Institute in the Sixth
Environmental Action Programme ("6EAP"):
In relation to international environmental governance, it should be noted
that the EU emerged as a global "green leader" in the second half of the
1980s. Observers have identified, among other factors, the withdrawal
of the U.S. as a leader in international environmental policy making, the
EU's (competitive) interest in promoting its own rather stringent
environmental standards at the international level, and the EU's desire
to shape its identity as a civilian world power as possible reasons for the
active role of the EU in international environmental policy making. 70
The result is the emergence of the EU as a leading environmental regulator with
reach well beyond the Common Market given the integrated nature of today's
economies and the size of its internal market.
67. Cf Issachar Rosen-Zvi, You Are Too Soft!: What Can Corporate Social Responsibility Do for
Climate Change?, 12 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 527, 527-30 (2011) (arguing that the failure of the
Copenhagen Summit rested in part on the declining effectiveness of the regulatory state and the rise of
non-state governance actors).
68. Noah M. Sachs, Jumping the Pond: Transnational Law and the Future of Chemical
Regulation, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1817, 1819-20 (2009) (noting that the EU's Registration, Evaluation, and
Authorization of Chemicals ("REACH") program is setting the defacto global standards in chemical
regulation).
69. See, e.g., Communication from the Commission - Developing an EU Civil Aviation Policy
Towards Brazil, at 1.1, COM (2010) 0210 final (May 5, 2010) ("[T]he European Commission has
proposed to launch targeted negotiations seeking to achieve comprehensive aviation agreements with
selected key partners in all regions of the world, with the aim of strengthening the prospects for
promoting European industry and ensuring fair competition, while at the same time seeking to reform
international civil aviation.") (emphasis added)); European Environment Agency, The European
Environment - State and Outlook 2010: Synthesis, at 9, State of the Environment report No. 1/2010
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.eea.europa.eu/soer/synthesis ("Continuing depletion of
Europe's stocks of natural capital and flows of ecosystem services will ultimately undermine Europe's
economy and erode social cohesion."). See also JAMES CONNELLY & GRAHAM SMITH, POLITICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 241 (Michael Waller & Stephen Young eds., 1999)
(describing EU environmental policy as dependent upon the "ecological modernisation" to minimize
conflict between environmental quality and economic growth by betting on technological advances).
70. Ecologic Institute, Berlin and Brussels, et. al., Final Rep. for the Assessment of the 6th Env't
Action Programme, at 119, DG ENV.1/SER/2009/0044 (Feb. 21, 2011) (emphasis added), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/newprg/pdf/Ecologic 6EAPReport.pdf.
71. See David A. Wirth, The EU's New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation 91 (Boston
Coll. Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 144, 2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1028733 (describing a new trend by which EU environmental policies are
having an impact on U.S. environmental policies). See also Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin & Stacy
D. VanDeveer, Expanding Transatlantic Relations: Implications for Environment and Energy Politics,
VOL. 41: 3432
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The EU's assumption of this role, however, cannot be seen solely as an
altruistic effort aimed at improving global living conditions writ large. As Michael
E. Porter further notes, "The performance of any company can be divided into two
parts: the first attributable to the average performance of all competitors in its
industry and the second to whether the company is an above- or below-average
performer in its industry." 72 Arguably, the same can be said of states. To the
extent that a state's internal market and regulatory systems can operate as an
"above-average performer" across a range of activities through innovation,
regulation, and process improvement, it holds a comparative and strategic
advantage over states that are simply average or below-average performers.
Singapore is arguably a case study in support of this principle.73 The reason for
this is simple: states with internal markets that perform above average and with
efficient regulatory systems not only possess significant economic clout, but they
position themselves to set favorable global standards-legal and otherwise. 74 As
all but the most sophisticated manufacturing and servicing activity is globalized
through integration and corporate restructuring,75 those states that control the
standards setting process, even informally,76 can position themselves to address
long-term environmental problems while promoting domestic innovation and
internal market development. Consequently, while there are philanthropic aspects
to the EU's global environmental efforts, it also reflects a keen desire to weave
sustainability, energy efficiency, health, and clean environment issues into its
practical economic objectives with the end result being an economy based on
in TRANSATLANTIC ENVIRONMENT AND ENERGY POLITICS: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 1, 1-18 (Miranda A. Schreurs, Henrik Selin & Stacy D. VanDeveer eds., 2009) (noting
the transatlantic cooperation and tension between the U.S. and the EU on matters regarding
environmental policy).
72. Michael E. Porter, Michael Porter on Competition, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 841, 844 (1999).
73. See generally GAVIN PEEBLES & PETER WILSON, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT IN
SINGAPORE: PAST AND FUTURE 1, 4-5 (2002) (discussing the current state and possible future of
Singapore's economy).
74. Cf Sachs, supra note 68, at 1819 (noting that the EU's REACH program is setting the defacto
global standards in chemical regulation). See also MANFREDI, supra note 42 (providing a guide to
measure the environmental impacts of a product during its life cycle).
75. See GILPIN, supra note 38, at 289.
76. See e.g., Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Trade, Growth and
World Affairs Trade Policy as a Core Component of the EU's 2020 Strategy, at 6-7, 11 COM (2010)
612 final (Sept. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Commission Communication: Trade] ("We [EU] will urge our
major trading partners to join and promote the use of existing sectoral regulatory convergence
initiatives such as the UN-Economic Commission for Europe ("ECE") regulations on automobiles, and
to participate actively in the development of international standards or common regulatory approaches
in a broad range of sectors. Indeed experience shows that it is much easier to tackle potential barriers
before regulatory practices become entrenched, both in well established EU industry sectors such as
automotives, machine tools and chemicals, but particularly in rapidly emerging sectors such as online
services or biotech."). The Commission also noted: "The biggest remaining obstacles lie in the
divergence of standards and regulations across the Atlantic, even though we [and the U.S.] have very
similar regulatory aims." Id. at 7.
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innovation and growth in emerging technologies." As the late U.S. House Speaker
Thomas "Tip" O'Neill so famously observed, "All politics is local." That includes
global politics and its interaction with parochial economic and environmental
interests.
Some fourteen principles now drive EU environmental and economic policy
including the polluter pays principle;78 a focus on sustainable development; 79 a
linking of environment, health, safety and consumer protection;80 a requirement
that environmental problems be rectified at the source;81 the integration of
environmental and health concerns into all aspect of EU policy-making; 82 and,
perhaps most influential, the notion of precaution to prevent problems and lower
risk.83 These principles impact a wide-range of industrial and economic interests
84 . 85 86such as construction, transportation, and energy, and drive the EU's policies
towards an interconnected environmental-economic regulation scheme within the
77. See, e.g., Council Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 16 (noting the new
technologies in the renewable energy sector that will incentivize economic growth); Commission
Communication: Trade, supra note 76, at 5 ("Our economic future lies in keeping a competitive edge in
innovative, high-value products, generating long term and well paid jobs."). See also Emily Barrett
Lydgate, Biofuels, Sustainability, and Trade-Related Regulatory Chill, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 157, 158
(2012) (discussing the relationship between the World Trade Organization and national sustainable
development policies); Jan H. Jans & Hans H.B. Vedder, European Environmental Law, 35 EUR. L.
REv. 112, 113-14 (2010); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Real Partnership for Development?
Sustainable Development as Treaty Objective in European Economic Partnership Agreements and
Beyond, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 139, 139 (2010) (noting that a sustainable development treaty is one way
of achieving integration of societal, the environmental, and the economic interests); More Member
States Agree NSRF 2007-13 with Commission, 210 EU Focus 20, 20 (2007) (discussing various
National Strategic Reference Frameworks); Commission Outlines its Taxation Priorities, 79 EU Focus
17, 17 (2001) ("[EU] tax policy must be fully consistent with other EU policies such as economic,
employment, health and consumer protection, innovation, environmental and energy policies.").
78. See Council Declaration, Programme of Action of the European Communities on the
Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 16.
79. See Treaty on European Union, art. 130r(1), 1992 O.J. (C 191) 35, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/l 1992M/htm/1 1992M.html#0001000001.
80. See id. art. 129a(b).
81. Id. art. 130r(2).
82. See id. art. 130r(2) (noting what the European Community shall consider when preparing its
environmental policy).
83. Id. See also Council Directive 2011/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2011 on the Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic
Equipment, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 88 (noting the use of the precautionary principle in EU policy).
84. See European Parliament Resolution of 15 December 2010 on Revision of the Energy
Efficiency Action Plan (2010/2107(INI)), 2012 O.J. (C 169) 66, 68.
85. See id. at 75; European Parliament Resolution of 25 November 2010 on International Trade
Policy in the Context of Climate Change Imperatives (2010/2103(INI)), 2012 O.J. (C 99) 94, 99.
86. See, e.g., Directive 2005/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2005
Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign Requirements for Energy-Using Products and
Amending Council Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council, 2005 O.J. (L 191) 29.
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Common Market that is increasingly transposed across the globe.87 Directives on
the use of renewable energies and bio-mass fuels 89 serve the dual propose of
promoting sustainability while propelling innovation and protecting established
and nascent European industries by imposing standards that others must adjust to
as a condition of market access.90 According to Tom Howes,
[T]he growth of renewable energy depends on new technologies and
processes, and ongoing efforts to improve the technology and bring
down costs. Consequently, there is a clear technology innovation drive
from the sector and a clear economic and employment benefit: the
sector employs over 1.4 million people . . .9
The EU's use of the "precautionary principle" does not simply express its clean
environment interests, it compels those in other states to alter their domestic
practices as a condition of gaining access to the Common Market, 92 while
promoting environmental innovation as a core economic driver at home.93
87. See Brandon Mitchener, Standard Bearers: Increasingly, Rules of Global Economy Are Set in
Brussels-to Farmers and Manufacturers, Satisfying EU Regulators Becomes a Crucial Concern-
From Corn to SUV "Bull Bars, " WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at Al.
88. See, e.g., Directive 2008/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2008 Amending Directive 2005/32/EC Establishing a Framework for the Setting of Ecodesign
Requirements for Energy-Using Products, as well as Council Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives
96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC, as Regards the Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission, 2008
O.J. (L 81) 48.
89. See, e.g., Council Directive 2009/28/EC, supra note 77, art. 19.
90. See e.g., WILL STRAW, DAVID NASH & REUBEN BALFOUR, EUROPE'S NEXT ECONOMY: THE
BENEFITS OF AND BARRIERS TO THE Low-CARBON TRANSITION 12, 13 (2012), available at
http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2012/05/europesnexteconomy-lowcarbontransition-
May2012 9182.pdf (noting that energy intensive industries are at risk from competitive pressures
relating to the low-carbon transition and, "[t]herefore, the loss of these companies to jurisdictions
outside the EU would harm Europe's low-carbon transition and cost jobs and economic output. . . .
Given these complexities, compensating the energy-intensive sectors and using diplomatic channels to
ensure that other jurisdictions commit to binding emissions reduction targets is a better approach than
reducing the EU's own ambition, which could make a global agreement less likely and reduce current
incentives for technological innovation.").
91. Tom Howes, The EU's New Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC), in THE NEW
CLIMATE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 117, 117 (Sebastian Oberthtlr & Marc Pallemaerts eds.,
2010).
92. See, e.g., Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2006 Concerning the Regulation, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 136) 3, 16, 24, 40 [hereinafter REACH Regulation]. See also Yoshiko Naiki,
Assessing Policy Reach: Japan's Chemical Policy Reform in Response to the EU's REACH Regulation,
22 J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172 (2010); Doaa Abdel Motaal, Reaching REACH: The Challenge for Chemicals
Entering International Trade, 12 J. INT'L ECON. L. 643, 643-45 (2009); Bernard Hoekman & Joel
Trachtman, Continued Suspense: EC-Hormones and WTO Disciplines on Discrimination and Domestic
Regulation: Appellate Body Reports: Canada/United States-Continued Suspension of Obligations in
the EC - Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R, adopted 14 Nov. 2008, 9 WORLD
TRADE REv. 151, 156 (2010).
93. Motaal, supra note 92, at 643; Porter & van der Linde, supra note 59, at 101 ("Innovation
offsets can be broadly divided into product offsets and process offsets. Product offsets occur when
environmental regulation produces not just less pollution, but also creates better-performing or higher-
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The willingness of the EU to go forward with the Aviation Directive in the
face of significant global opposition reflects (1) its unique character and market
size; (2) its linkage of economic security with the environment; (3) its desire to be
a global environmental regulator contributing to, if not outright commanding, the
standards setting process; and (4) its willingness to use its collective political and
economic clout to achieve the strategic policy objectives of the Member States and
the Brussels' bureaucracy through the use of law and regulation.94 It also reflects
the keen economic interests of the EU, which originated as a trading bloc. 95 By
integrating and projecting its market and regulatory power, the EU can position
itself to set environmental standards across a wide-range of industries, services,
and technologies, which benefit its own economic interests. 96  Although David
Bederman notes that international organizations are essential in setting global
standards, in part, because "[n]o single nation, or even group of countries, can
unilaterally raise standards,"9 this is true only to an extent. Notwithstanding
growing economic integration and interdependency, the most influential states
quality products, safer products, lower product costs (perhaps from material substitution or less
packaging), products with higher resale or scrap value (because of ease in recycling or disassembly) or
lower costs of product disposal for users.").
94. Joanne Scott, From Brussels with Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the
Chemistry ofRegulatory Attraction, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 897, 899, 939, 940-41 (2009).
95. See generally Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC); Commission of the
European Communities, Economic Growth and the Environment: Some Implications for Economic
Policy, at 1, COM (1994) 465 final (Mar. 11, 1994); Commission of the European Communities,
Directions for the EU on Environmental Indicators and Green National Accounting: The Integration of
Environmental and Economic Information Systems, at 2, COM (1994) 670 final (Dec. 21, 1994). See
also Damian Chalmers, Inhabitants in the Field of European Community Environmental Law, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 39, 41 (1999) (discussing the "ecologization" of EU economics and the
"economization" of the EU ecology); A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'Y 66,
66 (2007).
96. Lawrence A. Kogan, The Extra-WTO Precautionary Principle: One European "Fashion"
Export the United States Can Do Without, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 491, 491-92 (2008);
Constance E. Bagley, What's Law Got to Do With It?: Integrating Law and Strategy, 47 AM. Bus. L.J.
587, 587 (2010). See also STRAW et al., supra note 90, at 19-22 (making the following
recommendations with respect to the European economy and the ETS: "[1] Expand the EU ETS to
include imported energy-intensive goods. Serious consideration should be given to extending the ETS
into imported goods from energy intensive sectors if binding emissions commitments for 2020 are not
agreed by 2015. [2] Raise the carbon price. The EU should act to raise the price of carbon, which is
worryingly low. [3] Focus the EU's multiannual financial framework on innovation. In addition to the
demand-side measures described above, the EU should develop a set of supply-side policies. [4] Protect
ETS revenues for low-carbon projects. The ETS is partly undermined by concerns that it has become a
fiscal policy to raise revenue rather than a climate policy to reduce emissions. [5] Provide industry with
greater regulatory certainty. Industry participants from France, Germany and the UK called for more
stability in the EU's regulatory setting process. [6] Maximise the EU's role as a standard setter. Vehicle
emissions standards are a successful example of the EU generating a new market through standard
setting."). See also Two Ways to Make a Car, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/21549950 (noting that currently Brazil builds automotive engines
exclusively to EU standards).
97. Bederman, supra note 38, at 57.
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continue to possess significant capacity to dominate global regulatory systems9 8
often by conditioning access to vast internal markets on compliance with
domestically driven standards. 99 As G. John Ikenberry observed, "[a]ll states have
an interest in arriving at an agreement that coordinates policy-particular in areas
of business and trade regulation-but the leading state[s] can use its power
advantages to get other states to adopt its rules and regulations."100 Even where
these attempts have been successfully resisted in venues such as the WTO, 10 i the
fact remains that with regularity environmental and economic interests converge
with the most influential states using their extensive lawmaking capacities to
achieve advantageous outcomes within that convergence.102 From the ETS to the
Aviation Directive to its emerging "environmental foot printing" efforts, the EU is
positioning itself to be a global innovator and regulator across a range of economic
activities by using its environmental regulatory systems.' 03 To the extent that the
EU is successful in projecting its environmental standards on the global plane it
forces the commercial bases, markets, and political establishments of other states,
particularly in the developing world, to either adjust to its vision of the
98. Cf Michael Byers, The Complexities of Foundational Change, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Michael Byers & George Nolte, eds. 2003).
99. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 1235/2008, 2008 O.J. (L 334/ 25) 1 (EC); Marine
Mammals Protection Act of 1972, supra note 9. See also Willy, supra note 25 ("Europe has every right
to export this energy model to other developed countries, forcefully if necessary. It should stand up ...
[to] accurately price carbon in airlines as well as areas, such as oil taken from Canada's tar sands, even
if it means conflict with Ottawa. Europeans also, by their economic power, have the means to assert
themselves . . . . In addition, on the Western Eurasian landmass, which is to say in Europe's relations
with the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and Africa, the EU's trade position is so dominant that it
can effectively impose its preferences in that region.").
100. G. JOHN IKENBERRY, LIBERAL LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS, CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION OF
THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER 113 (2011).
101. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 1 1,
WT/DS332/AB (Dec.3, 2007) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres]; Appellate Body
Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 1 1, WT/DS2/AB/R
(Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline]; Appellate Body Report, Tuna-
Dolphin (2012), supra note 9, 1; Appellate Body Report, Australia-Measures Affecting the
Importation ofApples from New Zealand, 1, WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2010).
102. Pascal Liu, Alice Byers & Daniele Giovannucci, Value-Adding Standards in the North
American Food Market - Trade Opportunities in Certified Products for Developing Countries 1-2 (Mar.
18, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-ll07382; Michael W. Meredith, Malaysia's World
Trade Organization Challenge to the European Union's Renewable Energy Directive: An Economic
Analysis, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 399, 399, 404 (2012) (discussing how the EU's directive is seen by
some as green protectionism, the practice of adding non-environmental objectives that are
discriminatory, or overtly trade restrictive to environmental policy).
103. See generally FREDRIK ERIXON, GREEN PROTECTIONISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: How
EUROPE'S BIOFUELS POLICY AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE VIOLATE WTO
COMMITMENTS, ECIPE OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 1/2009 21 (Eur. Ctr. for Int'l Political Econ. ed.,
2009). Cf Julian L. Wong, Don't Miss the Forest for the Trees, U.S. Investment in Clean Energy at
Home Is the Best Response to China 's Protectionism, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (July 23
2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2010/07/23/8128/dont-miss-the-forest-for-
the-trees/ (noting that the U.S. risks falling behind China, the EU and others because it lacks a long-
term coordinated vision on the development of renewable energy).
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environment-economics equation or find themselves outside a huge market.'0
This is arguably no different than the U.S. using its position as the world's leading
financial system to achieve favorable domestic results in that field. 05 The fact that
the Aviation Directive pulls a good part of a global sector into the EU's carbon
market illustrates the capabilities that the most influential states have in setting
global standards, creating and regulating markets, and shaping conduct well
beyond their borders by using their vast economic power.'0 6  In the end, James
Carville is largely correct.
So why does this matter to public international law? For a long time the field
of public international law has been fixated on state-to-state relationships defined
by the symmetrical status of equal sovereigns. Yet one of the most powerful and
undervalued influences on the international legal order is the extent to which the
extraterritorial application of municipal law by powerful states shapes and alters
behavior patterns given global integration. As the Aviation Directive illustrates,
the most influential states have immense lawmaking and law-projecting
capabilities, often legitimatized by their perceived democratic nature and/or backed
by enormous economic strength as measured by the size of their internal markets
and their global trading profiles. These states also have a remarkable aptitude for
deploying their law projecting capabilities globally to achieve certain policy
objectives through the use of municipal regulatory systems. 0 7 When measured on
104. See European Union, CIA FACTBOOK (last updated Feb. 5, 2013), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ee.html (estimating EU GDP in 2012
at $15.7 trillion). See also Eric J. Boos, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The Changing Nature of U.S.
and EU Development Policy and its Effects on the Least Developed Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa,
11 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181, 181-83, 185 (2003) (noting that developing countries are concerned
that the U.S. and EU impose trade restrictions on labor and environmental grounds in order to satisfy
domestic interests); Donald P. Harris, TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion Part II: Back to the Past or a
Small Step Forward?, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 185, 189, 201 (2007) (discussing how the U.S. and EU
coerce developing countries by threatening to withdraw or halt foreign direct investment, close off
crucial markets, and impose retaliatory trade sanctions for failing to increase intellectual property
protection); Joanne Scott, The Multi-Level Governance of Climate Change, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REv. 25, 28, 30 (2011) (noting that several EU leaders are proposing a carbon border tax on products
from states with less stringent emission standards).
105. See Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act Protects
U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 U. MISSOURI-KANSAS L. REV. 965, 966 (2012).
106. Cf Noah Sachs, Planning the Funeral at the Birth: Extended Producer Responsibility in the
European Union and the United States, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 51, 62, 68 (2006) (noting the impact
California and the EU have on global standards setting).
107. See James L. Gunderson & Thomas W. Waelde, Legislative Reform in Transition Economies:
Western Transplants - A Short-Cut to Social Market Economy Status? 43 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 347, 347
(1994); Warren Pengilley, United States Trade and Antitrust Laws: A Study of International Legal
Imperialism from Sherman to Helms Burton, 1999 CCLJ LEXIS 1, 12, 16, 23 (1999); Austen Parrish,
The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality 's Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1475-76 (2008); Peter K.
Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REv. 975, 977-78 (2011); Haider Ala
Hamoudi, The American Commercial Religion, 10 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 107, 107-08 (2012). See
also JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA 280 (1980) (the law and development movement is "an energetic but flawed attempt to
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the global scale, regulations set by the most influential states matter well beyond
their borders; regulations set by small and developing states generally do not.
Consequently, this lawmaking and law-projecting capability enables some states to
dominate the global legal order-and therefore global behavior-even outside of
comprehensive multilateral frameworks or cooperation-based agreements.'o If the
EU can successfully use its municipal lawmaking capability to rework the
landscape of global environmental law in its economic favor,109 it expands its
global leadership, encourages the development of new industries and technologies
at home,1o forces other nations to adjust to its policy initiatives and standards, and
plays a more dominant role in shaping global markets and behavior by pushing its
standards ahead of others."' Basically, through the extraterritorial projection of its
environmentally-focused municipal law, the EU can become a powerful global
economic policy determiner.
The EU's assertiveness in global environmental regulation is not, therefore,
the product of happenstancell 2 or the pursuit of purely laudatory objectives. It also
reflects a keen and strategic effort to protect its long-range commercial interests as
transnational ecological problems become prime considerations in economic
development and economic innovation." 3 This is precisely why some perceive the
EU's ETS and other aggressive environmenial undertakings as trade protectionism
wrapped in a flag of law-based environmentalism-so-called "green
protectionism."ll 4 History is replete with examples of influential states shaping
provide American legal assistance and to transfer American legal models, which were themselves
flawed.").
108. Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Women and International Human Rights Law: The Challenges of
Colonialism, Cultural Survival, and Self-Determination, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 187, 189
(2010); Richard H. Steinberg, Who is Sovereign?, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 329, 340 (2004).
109. But see, MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 264 (noting that the EU often suffers from a
"capability-expectation gap" due to its structural inability to turn economic power into hard results).
110. Cf Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Innovating for
Sustainable Growth: A Bioeconomyfor Europe, at 2, COM (2012) 60 final (Feb. 02, 2012).
111. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Preemptive Capacity Expansion, 16 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. 629, 631 (1986) (noting that one approach to economic dominance is preemptive capacity
expansion in which a competitor "locks-up" a major portion of the market thereby discouraging other
entrants).
112. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 2493/2000, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 7 Nov. 2000 on Measures to Promote the Full Integration of the Environmental Dimension in the
Development Process of Developing Countries, 2000 O.J. (L 288) 43, 1-9.
113. Giorgio Maganza, The Treaty ofAmsterdam's Changes to the Common Foreign and Security
Policy Chapter and an Overview of the Opening Enlargement Process, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 174,
174 (1999).
114. See ERIXON, supra note 103; LAWRENCE A. KOGAN, 'ENLIGHTENED' ENVIRONMENTALISM OR
DISGUISED PROTECTIONISM? ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EU PRECAUTION-BASED STANDARDS ON
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo e/posp4 7_nf
tcenlightened e.pdf. The EU is not alone in using its municipal regulatory power to shape global
environmental behavior. See also Marine Mammal Protection Act, supra note 9; Austen L. Parrish,
Trail Smelter Deja Vu: Extraterritoriality, International Environmental Law, and the Search for
Solutions to Canadian-U.S. Transboundary Water Pollution Disputes, 85 B.U. L. REV. 363, 387-402
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global behavior. What is new is the extent to which the broadening use of
municipal law (in scope and subject) can be used to achieve global and domestic
policy objectives given the increasing integration of state economies, the
proliferation of transnational problems, and the substantial connectedness that now
exists between individual behavior abroad and domestic interests.
Whether the EU will be successful in increasing its influence over the global
environmental economic legal order remains an open question. The Aviation
Directive demonstrates an interesting paradox in the unilateral use of municipal
law to confront global problems. Global economic integration works in two
directions: the most influential states can dominate legal systems,' or they can be
forced by other influential states to accommodate alternatives standardsll 6 or run
the risk of disrupting vital trade and political interests.' '7 Thus, while the
combination of economic power, political acumen and provocative transnational
problems can incentivize a powerful state to aggressively extend its municipal law
transnationally, the success of that endeavor is hugely dependent upon other
similarly influential states yielding to the exercise. When they do not do this-as
may now be the case with the Aviation Directive-not only is a specific project
placed in jeopardy, but so too is the legitimacy of that state to act in a similar
manner as new problems arise. Stated differently, international relations is still a
game driven primarily by power politics and largely dominated by self-interest, no
matter how much we may try to convince ourselves that it has evolved to higher
standards of selflessness.
(2005) (describing the recent growth in the extraterritorial application of law in the environmental
context); Avoiding Green Protectionism - A New Program of World Growth, WORLD GROWTH (Dec. 6,
2010), http://worldgrowth.org/2010/12/avoiding-green-protectionism-a-new-program-of-world-growth-
december-2010/.
115. John C. Reitz, Export ofthe Rule ofLaw, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 429, 430-35
(2003).
116. Emily Barrett Lydgate, Biofuels, Sustainability, and Trade-Related Regulatory Chill, 15 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 157, 159-60 (2012) (discussing how EU biofuel regulations might violate WTO law).
See also America's Bounty: Gas Works, ECONOMIST (July 14,2012), available at http://www.economi
st.com/node/21558459 (noting that the U.S. reduced GHG emissions by 450 million tons over five
years by increasing natural gas power generation while Europe's GHG emissions continue to rise given
its reliance on coal).
117. See, e.g., Fredrik Erixon, The Rising Trend of Green Protectionism: Biofuels and the
European Union 2 (ECIPE Occasional Paper No. 2/2012, 2012). See also Gareth Porter Pollution
Standards and Trade: The "Environmental Assimilative Capacity" Argument, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV.
49, 49-51 (1998).
118. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General System of
Preferences Case Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? Law and Politics of Rights, 39 J.
WORLD TRADE 977, 977 (2005); Daniel Abebe, Great Power Politics and the Structure of Foreign
Relations Law, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 125, 126-27 (2009). But see Nico Krisch, International Law in Times
of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
369, 370-71 (2005).
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B. Relevant History of the ETS
A brief history of the EU's attempts to address climate change by regulating
carbon emissions under international environmental frameworks will provide
context for understanding the operation of the ETS today. The genesis of cap-and-
trade systems predates the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change ("UNFCCC")ll 9 and the Kyoto Protocol.120  However, these two
agreements gave global legitimacy to carbon trading systems well beyond their
historic roots in the U.S.121 In addition to the EU's ETS, so-called "cap-and-trade"
systems now exist or are under consideration in Australia, China, Korea, and the
U.S.12 2 The UNFCCC recognizes the "common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities . . . to protect the climate system for the benefit of
present and future generations of humankind."l 23  The recognition of
"differentiated responsibilities" means in practice that developed countries (often
referred to as "Annex 1 countries") are to "take the lead in combating climate
change and the adverse effects thereof." 24  Accordingly, the Kyoto Protocol
required Annex 1 countries (including those of the EU) to reduce their greenhouse
gas ("GHG") emissions by 2012, while recognizing that it will take considerably
longer for developing countries to meet similar objectives.125 The 1997 Kyoto
Protocol highlighted three approaches to promoting GHG reductions: (1) joint
implementations;' 26 (2) clean development mechanisms ("CDMs");127 and (3)
emissions trading.128
Historically, the EU was predisposed to a carbon tax129 and resisted
implementing a cap-and-trade system.130 However, in June 1998 the then fifteen
119. See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 771 U.N.T.S.
107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
120. See generally Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
121. See PAUL A.U. ALI & KANAKO YANo, Eco-FINANCE: THE LEGAL DESIGN AND REGULATION
OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL INSTRUMENTS 1-3 (2005) (discussing how cap-and-trade
originated in the U.S. to combat acid rain). See also Richard Conniff, The Political History of Cap and
Trade, SMITHSONIAN (August 2009), available at http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-
nature/Presence-of-Mind-Blue-Sky-Thinking.html.
122. Joshua Meltzer, Climate Change and Trade - The EU Aviation Directive and the WTO, 15 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 111, 153 (2012).
123. UNFCCC, supra note 119, art. 3(1).
124. Id.
125. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 120, arts. 2.3, 3.14, 10, 11.
126. Id. art. 6.
127. Id. art. 12. For a general discussion on CDM, see Charlotte Streck & Jolene Lin, Making
Markets Work: A Review of CDM Performance and the Need for Reform, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 409, 410
(2008).
128. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 120, art. 17.
129. See Steven Nathaniel Zane, Leveling the Playing Field: The International Legality of Carbon
Tariffs in the EU, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 199, 200-04 (2011).
130. Jonathan B. Wiener, Property and Prices to Protect the Planet, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
515, 526-28 (2009) (noting that after a decade of pursuing a carbon tax unsuccessfully while
denouncing cap-and-trade, the EU changed its position between 1998-200 1).
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members of the Common Market adopted a GHG burden sharing agreement, in
effect an emissions allocation system, under which each state agreed to specific
emission reduction targets. The aggregate of these targets constituted part of the
EU's overall Kyoto Protocol contribution towards reducing GHG emissions.' 31 It
was followed in 2000 by the European Commission's ("Commission")132 Green
Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union that
concluded, in part, that
[t]he Commission believes that a coherent and coordinated framework
for implementing emissions trading covering all Member States would
provide the best guarantee for a smooth functioning internal emissions
market as compared to a set of uncoordinated national emissions trading
schemes. A Community emissions trading scheme would lead to one
single price for allowances traded by companies within the scheme,
while different unconnected national schemes would result in different
prices within each national scheme. The development of the internal
market has been one of the driving forces behind the EU's recent
development, and this should be taken into consideration when creating
new markets. Climate change is the clearest case of transboundary
effects requiring concerted action. Moreover, scale effects at the level of
the EU will allow for significant cost-savings, while similar regulatory
arrangements will allow [the EU] to keep administrative costs as low as
possible. 133
The EU's creation of an ETS was something of a watershed moment. It was a
policy shift away from an exclusive preference for carbon taxes as a mean to
reduce emissions to a market-based systeml 34-or a combination of the two' 3 5 -
that enabled the EU to employ its considerable market clout to implement a GHG
reduction agenda.
131. See FRANK CONVERY, DENNY ELLERMAN, & CHRISTIAN DE PERTHUIS, THE EUROPEAN
CARBON MARKET IN ACTION: LESSONS FROM THE FIRST TRADING PERIOD, INTERIM REPORT 7-8
(2008), available at http://www.chaireeconomieduclimat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/08-03-
European-carbon-market-in-action-EN.pdf.
132. See Lisbon Treaty, supra note 23, art. 1(2)(b).
133. Commission Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union,
at 4, COM (2000) 87 final (Aug. 3, 2000), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com
/2000/com2000_0087en01.pdf. See also Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament: Bringing Our Needs and Responsibilities Together-Integrating Environmental
Issues with Economic Policy, at 1-3, COM (2000) 576 final (Sept. 20, 2000).
134. See Roberta Mann, How to Love the One You're with: Changing Tax Policy to Fit Cap-and-
Trade, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 145, 154-55 (2010) (discussing, in part, Europe's
increasing preference for environmental market-based measures in place of taxes). See also Wiener,
supra note 130, at 526-28.
135. Proposed Danish C02 Tax Reductions Conditionally Approved, EU Focus 2009, at 34-35.
See also David B. Hunter & Nuno Lacasta, Lessons Learned from the European Union's Climate
Policy, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 575, 576-77 (2009).
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The EU established the current ETS in 2003 to promote "reductions in GHG
emissions in a cost-effective and economically efficient manner."' 36 It was to be
implemented in three phases, with the final phase beginning January 1, 2013.137
The ETS is the first large-scale international carbon trading market of its kind,
covering approximately fifty percent of the EU's GHG emissions from listed
industries.138 It is built around a MBM framework centered on a "cap-and-trade
system" as distinguished from a "command and control system;" 13 that is,
emission limits were established and emitters are given relative flexibility in
meeting the limits through the buying, selling, and trading of European Union
emission allowances ("EUAs") as opposed to implementing specific mandated
emission control methodologies and technologies. 140 As originally constructed, the
ETS was a decentralized system with each Member State developing a National
Allocation Plan ("NAP")141 according to certain EU criteria.142  The NAPs
established "the total quantity of allowances that [a Member State] intends to
allocate for that period and how it proposed to allocate them."l 43 Key decisions
concerning the quantity and methodology of allocating EUAs were left to Member
States'" with the broad exception that (1) the NAP had to be based on objective
and transparent criteria,145 and (2) the amount of free EUAs would be reduced over
136. ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 1.
137. The ETS was to be implemented in three phases: (1) January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2007
was marked a pilot phase; (2) January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012 was the first commitment period
under which Member States were to meet their emission reduction obligations; and (3) January 1, 2013
to Dec. 31, 2020 is to provide a longer trading period to encourage long-term investment in emission
reduction.
138. Jon Birger Skjaerseth & Jorgen Wettestad, The EU Emission Trading System Revised
(Directive 2009/29/EC), in THE NEW CLIMATE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 65, 65-66, 74-75
(Sebastian Oberthitr & Marc Pallemaerts eds. 2010); Eric R.W. Knight, The Economic Geography of
European Carbon Market Trading 7 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1302982.
139. For an explanation of "cap-and-trade" and "command and control," see generally Robert N.
Stavins, Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments 1-2, 20 (Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei Working Paper No. 52, 2002; Kennedy Sch. of Gov't Working Paper No. 00-004, 2004),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-199848.
140. See Skjaerseth & Wettestad, supra note 138, at 67 (noting that the EU was initially of the
market-based approach because of its flexibility, but that such mechanisms are now part of Kyoto
Protocol).
141. See ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 9. But see, Directive 2009/29/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and
Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community, 2009 O.J. (L 140)
63 [hereinafter Directive 2009/29/EC] (establishing a central allocation scheme effective for 2013 and
beyond).
142. ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
143. Id.
144. See Case C-504/09 P, Comm'n v. Poland, 2012 E.C.R. 2 (Mar. 29, 2012), available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/listejsf~language-en&num=C-504/09%20P; Case C-505/09 P, Comm'n v.
Estonia, 2012 E.C.R. 12 (Mar. 29, 2012), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsflanguage=en
&num=C-505/09%20P. For a general discussion of legal challenges under the Emission Trading
Directive, see Josephine van Zeben, Respective Powers of the European Member State and Commission
Regarding Emissions Trading andAllowance Allocation, 12 ENVTL. L. REv. 216, 216-17 (2010).
145. ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 9.
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time. 14 In 2009, the EU centralized the authority for determining the quantity of
EUAs in the Commission beginning in 2013.147 This move was initiated to combat
the tendency of some states to liberally issue free EUAs, which had the effect of
depressing allowance values, producing windfall profits for some industries, and
doing little to actually reduce GHG emissions generated by the Community.148
Under Directive 2003/87/EC, Member States were required to ensure that as
of January 1, 2005, "no installation undertakes any activity listed in Annex I
resulting in emissions specified in relation to that activity unless its operator holds
a permit . . . ."149 Annex I activities include (1) energy; (2) production and
processing of ferrous metals; (3) the mineral industry, including the production of
cement, glass, and ceramic products; and (4) other activities including pulp and
paper product.1 50 Consequently, only certain GHG generating activities fell within
the ambit of the Directive and even then only activities within the EU qualified.''
Operators of these activities are required to obtain EUAs with each "unit"
representing the "right" to emit one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent during a
specified period.152 Article 6 of the Directive requires installation operators "to
surrender [EUAs] equal to the total emissions of the installation in each calendar
year." 53
Operators could acquire EUAs either directly from EU Member States or
from other persons holding EUAs.154 A key feature of the system was that EUAs
had to be transferable within the EU and with those in third countries where they
would be recognized.'5 ' Additionally, Article 2 of Directive 2004/101/EC
amended the ETS to enable operators to exchange "certified emissions reductions"
and "emissions reduction units" for EUAs up to a certain percentage of the allotted
allowances to that installation.' 5 6 These provisions then contributed to the market
mechanism by establishing channels that could eventually provide for global
carbon trading. ' By "capping" the total number of EUAs and establishing an
146. Id. art. 10, Annex H.
147. Directive 2009/29/EC, supra note 141, arts. 1(5), 1(11).
148. David Harrison Jr., Per Klevnas, Albert L. Nichols & Daniel Radov, Using Emissions Trading
to Combat Climate Change: Programs and Key Issues, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10367, 10378 (2008).
149. ETS Directive, supra note 1, art. 4.
150. Id. Annex 1.
151. See id. art. 27, Annex 1(1) (the former providing temporary exemptions from the directive and
the latter exempting installations used for research, development and testing of new products and
processes).
152. Id. art. 3(a).
153. Id. art. 6(2)(e).
154. Id. art. 12.
155. Id. art. 12(1).
156. Directive 2004/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance
Trading Within the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol's Project Mechanisms, 2004 O.J.
(L338) 18.
157. See A. DENNY ELLERMAN, THE EU EMissiON TRADING SCHEME: A PROTOTYPE GLOBAL
SYSTEM? 23 (2008), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Ellermanl1.pdf
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exchange mechanism for trading, the ETS seeks to reward low emitters by
allowing them to sell surplus EUAs while penalizing excessive emitters by
requiring them to purchase additional EUAs.' 5 8 The fact that so many EUAs are
issued free along with "grandfathering" has led some to question the efficacy of
this approach since even typically large emitters can nevertheless reap windfall
profits by selling surplus EUAs.159 But, at least in theory, the ETS incentivizes
industries and operators to lower their emissions within the Common Market (and
now globally) by using market forces rather than explicit reduction directives.
It is important to note that the ETS as developed and implemented by the EU
is not mandated by the UNFCCC or the Kyoto Protocol. 6 0  The Kyoto Protocol
only obligates a party to "[i]mplement and/or further elaborate policies and
measures in accordance with its national circumstances" to achieve "its quantified
emission limitation and reduction commitments . . . ."16 It is also important to
note that while the Kyoto Protocol called for reductions in emissions from aviation
and marine bunker fuels, this was to be done "working through the International
Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization,
respectively."l 62 Thus, the ETS is a unilateral response to climate change; it is not
a legal mandate of the Kyoto Protocol nor has either the International Civil
Aviation Organization ("ICAO") or the International Maritime Organization
("IMO") endorsed it. In point of fact, the ICAO has objected to the extension of
the ETS to the global aviation sector and has called upon the EU to reverse its
unilateral action.1 63 Consequently, the extension of the ETS to much of the global
aviation sector was an act unsupported by the consent of states outside the EU.
C. The ETS and the Aviation Sector
The Aviation Directive pulls a significant portion of the global aviation sector
into the ETS by giving the system broad extraterritorial effect. As previously
158. See Danielle Goodwin, Aviation, Climate Change and the European Union's Emissions
Trading Scheme, 6 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 742, 743 (2008).
159. Kathryn M. Merritt-Thrasher, Tracing the Steps of Norway's Carbon Footprint: Lessons
Learned From Norway and the European Union Concerning the Regulation of Carbon Emissions, 21
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 338-40 (2011); E. Woerdman, 0. Couwenberg & A. Nentjes, Energy
Prices and Emissions Trading: Windfall Profits from Grandfathering?, 28 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 185, 185-
86 (2009); Henry Van Geen, Emission Allowance Trading in the European Union, 11 INT'L ENERGY L.
& TAXATION REV. 299, 303-05 (2003).
160. ETS Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. 5. See also Final Report of the European Climate
Change Programme II Aviation Working Group, Annex I at 5 (April 2006), available at http://ec.europa
.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/docs/finalreport en.pdf (outlining options for extending the ETS
to aviation intra-EU only; all flights departing from the EU; all flights arriving or departing from the
EU). Other options discussed, but rejected, included intra-EU plus fifty percent of routes to and from
the EU; emissions in EU airspace; all flights departing from the EU and EU airspace; and intra-EU and
routes to and from countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
161. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 120, arts. 2.1, 2.1(a) (emphasis added).
162. Id. art. 2.2.
163. See International Civil Aviation Organization, Council - 194th Session Summary Minutes of
the Second Meeting on 2 Nov. 2011, $ 107, C-MIN 194/2 (Nov. 18, 2011), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/docs/minutes-icao en.pdf.
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noted, effective January 1, 2012 operators of non-exempt aircraft arriving at or
departing from the EU must hold or acquire a sufficient number of EUAs or
interchangeable credits to cover their carbon emissions.'" Additionally, aircraft
operators must "prepare a monitoring plan and monitor and report emissions in
accordance with that plan."' 65 The Commission has assigned various air carriers
(both EU and non-EU carriers) to "administrating Member States" to oversee
compliance with the Aviation Directive.'66  For example, Aeroflot is assigned to
Germany while Qatar Airways is assigned to the United Kingdom ("UK").'16  This
means, in practice, that Member States with vast international and regional air
transport hubs will receive a bulk of the income generated by auctioning of the
allowances, an issue that could become a point of some controversy as Member
States face significant budget challenges.
Like much of the EU's environmental policy, the ETS reflects both a strong
ecological rationale-such as combating climate change-and a strong economic
rationale-such as reducing energy consumption, incentivizing innovation,
establishing global standards, promoting favorable market mechanisms, and
protecting local industries. The Aviation Direction is no different in having a dual
purpose. The ecological rationale is rather obvious: the EU has "made a firm
independent commitment . .. to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20
[percent] below 1990 levels by 2020." 16' Thus, "[i]f the climate change impact of
the aviation sector continues to grow at the current rate, it would significantly
undermine reductions made by other sectors to combat climate change." 70 But the
economic rationale, while more subtle, is equally important. If the Aviation
164. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. T 16.
165. Id. T 15.
166. Commission Regulation (EU) No 100/2012 of 3 February 2012 Amending Regulation (EC)
No 748/2009 on the List of Aircraft Operators that Performed an Aviation Activity Listed in Annex I to
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on or after 1 January 2006
Specifying the Administering Member State for Each Aircraft Operator Also Taking into Consideration
the Expansion of the Union Emission Trading Scheme to EEA-EFTA Countries Text with EEA
Relevance, 2012 O.J (L39) 1.
167. Id. Annex IT 8, 124. For a complete list of airline assignments to administrating Member
States, see TT 3-132.
168. Council Directive 2008/101, 2008 O.J. (L 8) 3 (foreseeing that in 2012, eight-five percent of
the allowances will be given for free to aircraft operators and fifteen percent of the allowances will be
allocated by auctioning. In the trading period 2013-2020, eighty-two percent of the allowances will be
granted for free, fifteen percent of the allowances will be auctioned, and the remaining three percent
will remain in reserve for later distribution to fast growing airlines and new entrants into the market.)
For a full discussion on how EU-wide aviation allowances are to be calculated and allocated, see
Climate Action, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/climalpolicies/transport/aviation/allowanc
es/indexen.htm (last updated Oct. 27, 2011).
169. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. 4.
170. Id. I 11. But see Tate L. Hemingson, Comment, Why Airlines Should Be Afraid: The Potential
Impact of Cap and Trade and Other Carbon Emissions Reduction Proposals on the Airline Industry, 75
J. AIR L. & CoM. 741, 742 (2010) (noting that the aviation sector accounts for only two percent of GHG
emissions but is lumped in with the overall transportation sector, which accounts for one-third of
emissions).
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Directive applied only to the EU aviation sector it would have a market-distorting
effect by placing European airlines at a competitive disadvantage to their
international counterparts.171  European airlines would likely incur higher
operating costs as a function of complying with the ETS, costs that would include
those associated with administrative compliance, such as measuring and reporting
on emissions, and the costs of emission compliance, such as buying EUAs. There
are wildly varying estimates on the costs of compliance. 172 But this is clearly not a
cost-free exercise. The EU aviation sector would presumably pass these costs on
to customers through higher fees who might then decide to fly non-EU long-haul
carriers not subject to the ETS.17 3 Likewise, investors in the EU's aviation sector
might see lower returns given the costs of the programs. Consequently, absent
broad application the EU aviation sector would suffer a "carbon leakage"
problem' 74 as the cost from pricing carbon leads businesses and consumers to
relocate to, or obtain services from, countries with a lower carbon price.'75 The
result would be no net reduction in carbon emissions and yet higher costs to
European consumers.' 76 The universal application of the Aviation Directive to the
global aviation sector, in theory, addresses the economic challenges created by the
ETS by leveling the field between EU and non-EU carriers. It also promotes EU
environmental and economic standards given the increasing ties between the two
systems, the size of the Community's internal market, and the breath of the EU's
carbon trading market.
There are several features of Directive 2008/101/EC that are significant.
First, perhaps the most important feature of the directive and the feature that has
generated the greatest objection is the extent of its application. Under the 1944
Convention on International Civil Aviation ("Chicago Convention"), "[a]ircraft
have the nationality of the State in which they are registered."' 77 However, the
Chicago Convention also recognizes that,
the laws and regulations of a contracting state relating to the admission
to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air
navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while
171. See Aviation Directive, supra note 2, pmbl. 16.
172. See, e.g., Madhu Unnikrishnan, European Union, ATA Offer Wildly Difering Views on ETS
Costs, AvIATION DAILY, Oct. 31, 2011, at 3.
173. Meltzer, supra note 122, at 118-19.
174. Id. at 112-13.
175. For a fuller discussion of carbon leakage-competitive concern on other European industries,
see PEDRO LINARES & ALBERTO SANTAMARIA, THE EFFECTS OF CARBON PRICES AND ANTI-LEAKAGE
POLICIES ON SELECTED INDUSTRIAL SECTORS 3 (2012), available at http://www.climatestrategies.org/
research/our-reports/category/61/363.html.
176. See JULIA REINAUD, CLIMATE POLICY AND CARBON LEAKAGE: IMPACTS OF THE EUROPEAN
EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME ON ALUMINUM 2 (2008), available at http://www.iea.org/publications/fr
eepublications/publication/AluminiumEUETS-1.pdf. See also Steve Chamovitz, Trade and Climate
Change: Reviewing Carbon Charges and Free Allowances Under Environmental Law and Principles,
16 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 395, 398-99 (2010).
177. Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 17.
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within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of all contracting
States without distinction as to nationality . .1
Therefore, no clear rules exist
that the law of that state applies on board the aircraft in the same way as
the law of the flag state applies aboard ships, and the extent to which a
state's laws apply to events occurring on board an aircraft registered in
its territory has been largely left to states to determine for themselves.' 79
As a result, the Aviation Directive does not limit itself to the EU aviation
sector or intra-EU air travel, both of which are clearly under the EU's jurisdiction.
Rather, the Aviation Directive extends the ETS to all segments of all flights of
non-exempt operators without regards to the principles of nationality or
territoriality, in effect forcing a significant part of the global aviation sector into
the EU's carbon trading market. With few exceptions, all flights to or from the EU
must account for their carbon emissions and surrender a sufficient number of
EUAs regardless of nationality of the air carrier or territorial location of the
emission generating activity. Therefore, emissions from EU- bound or departing
aircraft include generating activity (1) over EU's territory; (2) over the territory of
non-EU states; (3) in international airspace; and (4) while on the ground in a third
country.' 80
This broad application results from the Aviation Directive's fuel consumption
formula, which is based on the "[a]mount of the fuel contained in aircraft tanks
once fuel uplift for the flight is complete [minus] amount of fuel contained in
aircraft tanks once fuel uplift for subsequent flight is complete [plus] fuel uplift for
that subsequent flight."' 8' Thus, a flight from Hong Kong to Frankfurt must hold
EUAs for its total fuel consumption (and therefore total carbon emissions) from
point of departure to the point of landing, including the running of an auxiliary
power unit while parked at the gate.182 A non-exempt aircraft operator that has
exhausted its free EUAs must then purchase additional EUAs from other holders.
As free EUAs are reduced over time,'8 the global aviation sector will be forced to
purchase additional EUAs in the carbon market where hopefully a raise in carbon
prices will spur behavioral changes and innovation.
Second, under the Aviation Directive the Commission may exclude from the
ETS airlines from a third country if it has adopted "measures for reducing the
climate change impact of flights departing from that country which land in the
Community .... " 8 4  This vaguely worded provision, when read in conjunction
178. Id. art. 11.
179. Eileen Denza, International Aviation and the EU Carbon Trading Scheme: Comment on the
Air Transport Association of America Case, 37 EUR. L. REv. 314, 325 (2012) (citation omitted). See
also Chicago Convention, supra note 17, arts. 17-21.
180. See Aviation Directive, supra note 2, Annex 2(b). See also Meltzer, supra note 122, at 114.
181. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, Annex 2(b).
182. Cf id. (describing calculation for fuel consumption).
183. Id. art. 3(c).
184. Id. $18.
448 VOL. 41: 3
THE EU's ETS AND GLOBAL AVIATION
with the Directive's Preamble language of "equivalent measures,"' 8 5 appears to
give the Commission significant authority to assess the sufficiency of a third
country's carbon reduction programs. Although the EU has stated that it intends to
seek "optimal interaction" between trading systems to avoid double regulation, the
fact remains that third country measures must in the view of the Commission
"have an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of this Directive"1 6 before
an exemption is granted. This provision encourages two unstated objectives: (1)
promoting the EU's emission trading system as the globe's aspirational standard;
and (2) promoting the tie between environmental regulations and economic activity
with the EU as a precursor to further technological and industrial innovation.
Whether provisions within the Directive authorizing recognition of third party
measures will incentivize the development of a global ETS system that aligns with
the EU's ETS remains an open question.'8 7 However, absent objective standards
for assessing whether third country's measures have an "environmental effect at
least equivalent to [that of the ETS]," it is difficult to see how the question of
equivalency can be assessed in a transparent, objective and apolitical manner given
the interdependencies of the global economy.' 8 8 The lack of objective standards
may, in practice, lead to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Aviation Directive
by granting accommodations to third countries that amounts to a race to the
bottom. Or, it may do so by creating complete paralysis in efforts to obtain a
global GHG emissions reduction agreement given vast difference over what
constitutes "equivalent" measures now that the EU's ETS is in place and
operational.
Finally, funds derived from the ETS are intended to "tackle climate change in
the EU and third countries."'18 However, the Aviation Directive also states that,
"[i]t shall be for Member States to determine the use to be made of revenues
generated from the auctioning of allowances."190  This language raises two
important issues. First, although there is a political agreement that a significant
portion of the revenues generated by the auctioning EUAs will be dedicated to
reducing GHG emissions, to fund research and development, and to cover the costs
of administering the ETS,1'9 the revenues are paid directly to Member States and
therefore can be diverted to other purposes.1 92  While the Aviation Directive
185. Id. pmbl. 17.
186. Id.
187. See Hua Lan, Comments on EU Aviation ETS Directive and EU - China Aviation Emission
Dispute, 45 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 589, 600-01 (2011).
188. Cf Airbus Supports China's Opposition to EU Emissions Tax, CHINA DAILY (June 13, 2012,
9:21 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-06/13/content 15497338.htm (describing
negative reactions by entities from European, Chinese, and U.S. aviation industries to EU taxing
international airlines under ETS).
189. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 14.
190. Id.
191. Id. 22; Council Conclusions on Climate Finance - Fast Start Finance, at % 5-7 (May 15,
2012), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/130262
.pdf A
192. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 22.
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strongly suggests that the revenue should be dedicated to addressing climate
change, nothing prevents a Member State from using the revenues to cover, for
example, the costs of state pensions.' 93 Second, because the global aviation sector
must acquire EUAs issued by Member States even for emissions that occur outside
the EU, the ETS's revenue generating provisions effectively forces the global
aviation industry into the EU's carbon market by attaching to economic activity
occurring outside the territory of the EU. Whether this constitutes an
extraterritorial tax is debatable.194  What is less debatable is that the Aviation
Directive establishes an extraterritorial revenue generating mechanism that, for the
most part, ignores issues of nationality and territoriality with respect to global
aviation economic activity.
D. Legal Validity of the ETS-the ECJ's Opinion
In addition to the diplomatic row caused by the EU's unilateral extension of
the ETS to third country airlines-such as threats to remove landing rights for
European airlines,' 95 introduction of legislation prohibiting airlines from
complying,'96 and formal objections' 97-the Aviation Directive was almost
immediately challenged in the courts. The Air Transport Association of America
("ATA"), along with a number of U.S. and Canadian airlines, initiated suit in the
High Court of England and Wales ("Queens Bench") seeking a preliminary ruling
on the validity of the UK's regulations implementing the Aviation Directive.198
Because the case implicated the validity of EU legislation and was thus beyond the
competence of a national court,199 the case was referred to the ECJ under Article
267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU").20 0
On December 21 2011, the ECJ issued its ruling rejecting the ATA's
challenge holding generally that neither customary international law nor existing
treaties barred the EU from applying its directive to third country aircraft operators
193. Cf Minister Says Suspend EU ETSfor Two Years, GLOBAL TRAVEL INDUSTRY NEWS (Mar.
21, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.eturbonews.com/28426/minister-says-suspend-eu-ets-two-years
(noting that UK's Air Passenger Duty ("APD") started off as a "green tax" but is now a pure revenue-
raising mechanism).
194. See Meltzer, supra note 122, at 127.
195. See, e.g., James Fontanella-Khan, et al., India Warns EU on Airline Carbon Tax, FINANCIAL
TIMES, May 25, 2012, at 1 (noting that India has threatened to bar European airlines from its airspace
should sanctions be imposed against its airlines for non-compliance).
196. See, e.g., European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R. 2594,
112th Cong. §§ 2-4 (2011).
197. See, e.g., Chinese Airlines Oppose ETS, SHANGHAI DAILY, Mar. 22, 2011,
http://www.china.org.cn/business/2011-03/22/content 22195295.htm (describing statement the China
Air Transport Association ("CATA") sent to the EU about ETS on 10 March 2011).
198. See Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 1-2, 45.
199. Id. T 47.
200. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 267, Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 164 [hereinafter TFEU] (national court may apply to the ECJ for preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of the treaties or the validity or interpretation of acts of the EU).
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or to those operating outside of its territory.201 It is not necessary to conduct an
extensive review of the ECJ ruling with respect to the technical validity of the
ETS. However, three particular issues are noteworthy: the status of the EU as a
supranational lawmaking entity with separate legal personality; the conditions
under which international law forms a benchmark against which EU law is
measured; and the ETS's extraterritorial revenue generating mechanism.
First, as an entity with legal personality, the EU is unique.202 One observer
has noted:
The misunderstandings [of the power of the European Union] have
multiple sources, not least of which has been the failure of political
scientists to reach an agreement on the character of the EU. It is more
than a conventional international organization, but it is less than a state.
Establishing its character has been made more difficult by the rearguard
actions fought by European governments in the name of national
sovereignty, which have combined with the pioneering nature of the EU
experiment to produce a system of policy-making that is segmented,
complex, often unpredictable and constantly changing. Unlike the
founders of the United States or the French Fifth Republic, the founders
of the European Union did not draw up a constitution to serve as a
blueprint for a new system of government, but instead reached some
general agreements about some policy goals, and have spent the last
[fifty] years editing those agreements in order to redefine the nature of
integration. 203
The status and authority of the EU as a regulator is a point of contention across the
globe and within the EU itself. Unlike a federated union with a clear hierarchy of
authority, the EU is something of a limited confederation in which its principal
actors-the Member States-have ceded some authority to a supranational body
but have not ceded their status as sovereign states. In reverse, the EU has assumed
powers as a supranational governing institution that, in theory, sits separate and
apart from its Member States-at once bound to and liberated from its creator.
As a supranational body with independent legal personality, the EU has
declared that it is not bound by international agreements unless it has agreed to be
so, unless it has assumed from the Member States authority over a particular
matter, or unless another body has exclusive jurisdiction over a subject the EU
would otherwise seek to regulate. 204 As the ECJ pointed out with regards to the
Chicago Convention, the EU is not a signatory to the Convention 205 and the ICAO
has not assumed exclusive authority over aviation.206 While all Member States are
201. See Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 129.
202. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 47, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 41
[hereinafter TEU].
203. MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 69.
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bound by the Chicago Convention, the EU itself is not.207 Consequently, the ECJ
declared that the EU can neither be bound by the Convention nor can the
Convention be relied upon to defeat an act of an EU institution. 208 The ECJ's
opinion essentially recognizes the institution of the EU as possessing the qualities
of a quasi-state for certain purposes, leading to the larger unresolved question of
what now constitutes a "state" for purposes of international law.
Second, the ECJ has often acknowledged that EU institutions are bound by
international law, including customary international law. 209 However, being bound
by international law and subjecting acts of EU institutions to scrutiny under
international law are two different considerations. According to the ECJ, for an
international agreement to limit EU authority, two conditions beyond membership
must be met: (1) the "nature and the broad logic of [the agreement concerned] do
not preclude [such a review of validity]"; 210 and (2) the agreement must be
unconditional and sufficiently precise as to confer some right upon the
individual.211  For example, in contrast to its conclusions relative to the
applicability of Chicago Convention, the ECJ found with regard to the Kyoto
Protocol that notwithstanding the EU's membership that it conferred no rights
upon individuals 212 and, in any event, it was not sufficiently precise as to grant
exclusive authority over aviation to another institution preempting EU authority.213
Stated differently, the Kyoto Protocol may have imposed binding obligations on
EU institutions leading to the promulgation of binding regulations to effectuate its
purposes, but it could not be read as conferring any individual standing to
challenge regulations promulgated in pursuit thereof Moreover, with regard to the
Open Skies Agreement,2 14 the ECJ found that it could be read to confirm rights
upon individuals, 215 and was sufficiently precise, 216 but nevertheless the ETS was
completely compatible with the agreement.217 Consequently, according to the ECJ,
none of the cited agreements could defeat the broad regulatory application of the
Aviation Directive.
The ECJ also held that the same interpretative principles generally applied
within the context of customary international law: (1) the principles are capable of
calling into question the subject-matter competence of the EU; and (2) the custom
affects "rights which the individual derives from European Union law or to create
207. Id. 71.
208. Id. 72.





214. See generally United States European Union Air Transport Agreement, U.S.-E.U., Apr. 27 &
30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 470 [hereinafter Open Skies Agreement].
215. Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 84.
216. Id.
217. Id. % 131-157.
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obligations under European Union law in [the individual's] regard." 218 Applying
this analysis, the ECJ rejected challenges to the Aviation Directive under the
customary international law principles of sovereignty of airspace, freedom of
international airspace, and jurisdiction of aircraft in international airspace. 219 The
ECJ concluded that in as much as flights subject to the Aviation Directive
performed some activities within an EU Member State, they were subject to "the
unlimited jurisdiction of the European Union."220 It stated that since the Aviation
Directive was intended to provide a high level of environmental protection, the EU
may permit commercial activity within its territory "on condition that operators
comply with the criteria that have been established by the European Union and are
designed to fulfill the environmental protection objectives." 221 It also explained
that using activities that take place outside EU airspace for purposes of applying
the Aviation Directive does not impinge upon the sovereignty of non-EU states.222
Finally, the ECJ rejected the claimants' contention that the Aviation Directive
amounted to an unlawful tax in violation of the Open Skies Agreement. In
rejecting this attack, the ECJ distinguished the allowance system from a tax, duty,
or fee on fuel stating, in part, that "it is not intended to generate revenue for public
authorities . . . .223 The ECJ concluded that the Aviation Directive does not
breach Open Skies Agreement provisions that exempt fuel from taxes and other
fees as it found no direct or inseverable link exists between the cost of the Aviation
Directive and fuel used.224 This conclusion is highly suspect, given that Member
States are free to use revenue generated by the sale of EUAs for other purposes
notwithstanding political commitments to support climate change programs.225
The ECJ appears to have ignored the fact that the directive clearly states that
income generated by the sale of EUAs were under the discretion and control of
Member States.226
218. Id. 107.




223. Id. 143. The ECJ also held that the Aviation Directive did constitute a tax because it was not
a rate-based system but rather the costs of compliance depended as much on market conditions as upon
action of state authorities. See id. 1145-147.
224. Id. 142, 143.
225. At least one Member State, the UK, refuses to "ring-fence" revenue generated by the sale of
carbon credits for climate change projects. Report Criticises the UK Over Its Refusal to Earmark EU
ETS Carbon Revenues for Financing Green Projects, GREENAIR ONLINE.COM (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.greenaironline.com/news.php?viewStory-1077.
226. The issue of how ETS revenues generated by aircraft operations are to be used presents the EU
with two rather thorny problems. First, as originally presented, the revenue generated by aircraft
operations was to be used principally for climate change programs. See Aviation Directive, supra note
2, 22 (revenues generated from auctioning allowances should be used to reduce GHG emissions, adapt
to climate change, fund research and development, cover the cost of administration, fund contributions
to the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund, and undertake measures to avoid
deforestation and facilitate adaptation in developing countries). If dedicated to these purposes, the
revenues arguably would not amount to a general tax per se, but rather a fee dedicated to a specific
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What is perhaps most fascinating in the ECJ's decision is the degree to which
the ECJ sustained the EU's climate change efforts by promoting the concept of
"unlimited jurisdiction" 227 and the degree to which the Court relied on EU treaties
alone to justify extending the EU's authority beyond its borders to encompass
aviation activities occurring in third states. An aircraft operator is now subject to
very specific EU jurisdiction-the Aviation Directive-no matter where on the
planet it is headquartered so long as its aircraft arrive at or depart from an
aerodrome in an EU Member State. The Aviation Directive does not simply
require an aircraft operator in a third country to hold sufficient EUAs for a
particular flight. It requires that operator to develop and maintain sophisticated
emission calculation and reporting systems even if only a relatively small
percentage of its flights are connected to Europe and even if only a small
percentage of its emissions actually occur over EU airspace. Moreover, in its final
discussion on the applicability of customary international law, the ECJ noted that,
"European Union policy on the environment seeks to ensure a high level of
protection in accordance with art. 191(2) TFEU .... The EU, therefore, claims
broad authority to regulate transnational economic activity based not only on its
international obligations (which cannot be challenged), but also on the
transnational extension of the aspirational guarantees contained in the TFEU.229
Stated differently, because the TFEU seeks a high level of environmental
protection within the EU, institutions of the EU by extension must have broad
authority to regulate activity occurring outside the EU that jeopardize the
guaranteed protection. This is not only an extraordinary example of the assertion
of municipal jurisdiction beyond the physical boundaries of a state; it is an
example of the capacity of influential states to use the notion of substantial
connections to capture the virtual space between what is domestic and what is
international for regulatory purposes.
cause not unlike security fees imposed on air transport passengers. However, the lack of any authority
within the EU to demand that Member States dedicate revenue to this purpose leaves states with
discretion to use the funds as they see fit. See, e.g., id. ("Decisions on national public expenditure are a
matter for Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity."). Arguably, this seriously
jeopardizes the legitimacy of both the EU's and the ECJ's position with regards to whether the ETS is a
tax under Open Skies. See, e.g., Open Skies Agreement, supra note 214, art. 1. Given the current fiscal
crisis now gripping states such as Greece, Italy and Spain, policymakers will be hard pressed not to
divert Aviation Directive revenues to general government purposes, e.g., funding schools, pensions,
defense, healthcare. The current practice of Member States, except Germany, is to plough revenues
raised from carbon permit auctions into general expenditures. This calls into question the entire
integrity of the ETS as a climate change initiative, leading to the possible conclusion that the Aviation
Directive is nothing more than a revenue generating exercise in practice if not in theory. Second, and
possibly more divisive within the EU, is that Member States to whom a large number of airlines have
been assigned will potentially reap windfall revenues over time that, as noted, could be applied to
general government operations. States with smaller assignments will receive far less revenue for either
climate change initiatives or general government operations.
227. Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 1 124. It should be noted that in the French version of the
decision the term "unlimited jurisdiction" is expressed as the "pleine jurisdiction."
228. Id. 128.
229. Id.
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III. THE AVIATION DIRECTIVE AS INDICATOR
This article began with the assertion that the Aviation Directive provides a
platform upon which to see an emerging trend in international law: the use of
municipal law to regulate global relationships and behaviors. Alone, the Aviation
Directive does not represent a momentous shift in "international" lawmaking so
much as it serves as an indicator of the how the most influential states can assert
and protect their self-interests in a global arena. Other states have acted likewise
to project their political values, economic interests, and legal norms unilaterally
using municipal law. 230 But the Aviation Directive is an important example of
how states and institutions such as the EU use a combination of economic power,
political power, and municipal lawmaking to protect their interests.23'
As transnational problems explode and the world becomes more integrated in
terms of economics, energy, culture, 232 security, and the environment, the actions
of one state can clearly have parochial and global consequences for others.233 The
embedded liberalism pushed by Western states and so embraced by the world234
may in the end have encouraged so much integration, in both the economic and
non-economic spheres, that distinctions between the limits of state legal authority
and the limits of international legal authority blur incentivizing the greater
extraterritorial application of municipal law as a tantalizing alternative to
multilateralism. The importance of the Aviation Directive lies in what it says
about changing attitudes concerning the nature of the "state" and the agility of the
most influential states to alter global behavior through their municipal lawmaking
and regulatory apparatuses.
230. See generally Smitherman, supra note 9, at 771-72.
231. See, e.g., Press Release, European Commission, Knowledge, Responsibility, Engagement: The
EU Outlines its Policy for the Arctic (July 3, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-
12-739_en.htm?locale=en; Press Release, European Commission, Strengthening Europe's Place in the
World: An External Budget for 2014-2020 to Respect EU Commitments and Promote Shared Values
(Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1510;
Organization Environmental Footprint (OEF), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eussd/corp
orate footprint.htm; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PRODUCT ENVIRONMENTAL FOOTPRINT (PEF), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/environmentleussd/product footprint.htm; THE EU ARCTIC FOOTPRINT AND
POLICY ASSESSMENT PROJECT, THE EU ARCTIC FOOTPRINT, available at http://arctic-footprint.eu/.
232. See, e.g., Brand of Dreams: America is Wooing Foreign Tourists for the First Time,
ECoNOMIST, June 30, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21557782 (noting that one Brazilian's
explanation for not visiting the U.S. is "[t]he United States did such a good job of tuming Brazilians
into Americans it's not all that different.").
233. See, e.g., Steven Wheatley, A Democratic Rule offlnternational Law, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 525,
528-29 (2011) ("The consequences of industrialization, globalization, and modernization have resulted
in policy issues that states acting alone cannot regulate effectively (global warming, the international
financial markets, and international terrorism, etc.), and states accept the need for highly focused
cooperation and coordination efforts in the various sectors of global society (trade, environment, human
rights, etc.).").
234. See JONATHAN GRAUBART, LEGALIZING TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM: THE STRUGGLE TO
GAIN SOCIAL CHANGE FROM NAFTA's CITIZEN PETITIONS 9 (2008).
2013 455
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
A. Managing Interstate Relations
For some 300 years the theoretical legal management of the international
relations system was premised on the notion of sovereign equality and non-
interference in the affairs of other states. These were not merely geographically-
based concepts. Rather, their importance rested in the assumed quality of the
nation-state as an autonomous, self-regulating, and sovereign political constituent
equal to all other like constituents. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted more than
100 years ago, "[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another, done within its own territory."235
Sovereignty did not merely mean physical control of geographical territory; it
meant the exclusive control of all of the means available to a state to regulate
relationships and behavior within its territory.236 Whether this assumed quality of
the nature of the state reflected the actual equality of the state are two separate
considerations. While states may enjoy legal equality in theory under international
law, it is self-evident that not all states enjoy equivalent influence and, therefore,
are not created equal when measured on the broader plains of economic, political,
legal and cultural power. The world of statehood is a place of evolving and
relative equities and parities, not static and absolute equalities. The globalization
of economic activity and its attendant impacts on states means that developments
in one part of the world can rapidly have dire consequences in another part of the
world demanding domestic regulation of extraterritorial activities as a means of
self-preservation. The relative parity of states is the very reason that some are far
more capable of defining global rules and global behavior than are others.
The Aviation Directive demonstrates that globalization combined with the
openness and plasticity of the international law system237 leaves ample space for
the most powerful states to influence the internal legal regimes of other states, or to
influence how individuals behave in other parts of the world. Global phenomena
such as climate change, economic integration, resource management, and
transnational security concerns now serve to entice states to act extraterritorially in
an effort to favorably shape their global interdependencies, 238 protect local
235. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
236. Cf KRASNER, supra note 11, at 227; MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW,
POWER, AND THE SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 93, 124 (1995).
237. For example, a state may sign a treaty but then make numerous reservations to critical
provisions effectively rendering its obligations a nullity. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J.
INT'L L. 307, 307-08 (2006); Catherine Logan Piper, Note, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: The
Goal of Universality, 71 IOWA L. REV. 295, 308 (1985); Andrds E. Montalvo, Reservations to the
American Convention on Human Rights: A New Approach, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 269, 274-76
(2001).
238. Cf Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American
Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 208 (1996) ("Extraterritoriality results in frequent
conflicts between the United States and other nations."); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg,
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual Property Matters, 77
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markets, 239 promote specific behaviors, 240 and address problems whose origins
may rest elsewhere but nevertheless have a clear domestic impact. 241 The world is
not a collection of legally isolated states. It is a world of asymmetrical paradoxes
marked by a greater need for multilateralism offset by tempting opportunities for
state unilateralism. 242
The Aviation Directive evidences this paradox in three ways. First, at a
policy level, the Aviation Directive demonstrates that the most influential states
retain significant influence over the international legal order even as their formal
authority has been constrained by the diffusion of global political power.243 States,
such as the U.S., the EU, and now China, exercise this influence by combining
their distinctive lawmaking capabilities with their economic strengths leveraging
both to achieve particular objectives. 244 As EU Climate Commissioner Hedegaard
stated, "[t]his is very much proof that we in the Commission do not think we
should sit idly waiting for the big international agreement." 245 Moving forward in
Europe means unilaterally globalizing Europe's climate change framework using
its considerable collective regulatory and economic power, 246 an approach used by
the other most influential states as well.247 The EU is clearly prepared to play to its
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1065, 1117 (2002) ("Extraterritorial application of law has become worrisome to
many observers because it interferes with sovereign authority by limiting the extent to which a State can
control the local conditions . . . .").
239. Cf Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 103 (2001); Ariel Ezrachi, Globalization of Merger Control: A Look at
Bilateral Cooperation through the GE/Honeywell Case, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 397,400 (2002).
240. Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. 109-293, 120 Stat. 1344, §§ 301-02 (2006); Stop Online
Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112 b Cong. § 102 (2011). See also REACH Regulation, supra note 92.
241. See Parrish, supra note 114, at 387-88; Colleen Graffy, Water, Water, Everywhere, nor any
Drop to Drink: The Urgency of Transnational Solutions to International Riparian Disputes, 10 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 399, 424 (1998).
242. See e.g., Hedegaard, supra note 10.
243. Cf Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
54, 72 (1997) (noting that U.S. law is applied transnationally creating entities able to operate across
borders).
244. Cf Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in
Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 239 (2004) ("The inherent
discriminatory nature of bilateralism/regionalism is often blended with an internal power disparity and
ultimately begets unilateralism. Unilateralism, which is often clad with extraterritoriality, tends to
eclipse international trade law, thereby placing the global trading system at the mercy of bare politics by
a handful of powerful states.").
245. Hedegaard, supra note 10.
246. Aaron R. Harmon, The Ethics of Legal Process Outsourcing -Is the Practice of Law a "Noble
Profession, " or is it Just Another Business?, 13 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 41, 44 (2008) (noting that "[t]he
European Union has largely consolidated its economies, raising its collective resources and influence.").
247. See Richard Frimpong Oppong, The African Union, the African Economic Community and
Africa's Regional Economic Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
92, 93 (2010); Jason Pierce, A South American Energy Treaty: How the Region Might Attract Foreign
Investment in a Wake of Resource Nationalism, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 417, 437 (2011); Rafael Leal-
Arcas, Proliferation of Regional Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?,
11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 597, 620-21 (2011). See also Smitherman, supra note 9, at 783 (noting that other
supranational bodies are seeking to broaden their global influence as well).
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strengths and push its climate change agenda even in the absence of a multilateral
consensus on the specific approaches to be used to address atmospheric carbon
levels.248 The combination of power, impatience, and transnational problems
provide fertile ground for aggressive unilateralism on the part of some contrary to
the so-called embedded liberal framework that was supposed to promote greater
integration while containing national adventurism. 249
Second, in the absence of a binding multilateral framework, the
implementation of the Aviation Directive indicates that the EU is positioning itself
to create and regulate carbon markets by defining and setting the standards of
equivalency. 25 As noted earlier, while all states have an incentive to seek
common policy on transnational issues, the state that leads the effort can often
force other states to adapt to its standards. Within the context of the ETS and the
Aviation Directive, the EU can achieve its objectives in three ways: (1) by tightly
regulating its carbon market, which is the largest in the world; 251 (2) by defining
what constitutes equivalency between its carbon markets and emerging third-
country carbon reduction policies thereby driving the latter to largely comport with
the former; 252 and (3) by broadening the definition of what constitutes economic
activity within the Common Market thus expanding its transnational regulatory
reach into activities that occur in third states. The Aviation Directive, to the extent
it is successfully implemented,253 drives a significant segment of a global industry
into a regional carbon trading system and extends the EU's regulatory powers into
spaces previously assumed to be reserved to other states.254 The mere act of
landing at, or departing from, an aerodrome in the EU effectively constitutes
248. See, e.g., Council Directive 2009/30, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 88 (EC). See also Michael Taylor &
Sabrina Davis, Oil Sands and European Union Fuel Quality Directive (FQD): an Update,
LEXOLOGY.COM (Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-cc8066c
7-4eb8-4318-b89d-570aa518bbad.
249. Cf Jeffrey A. Hart & Aseem Prakash, Globalisation and Regionalisation: Conceptual Issues
and Reflections, 2 INT'L TRADE L. & REGULATION 205, 205 (1996).
250. Similarly, the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§
401, 768 (2009) sought to include imports in the U.S. cap-and-trade system starting from 2020 through
"intemational reserve allowances" to offset lower energy and carbon costs of manufacturing covered
goods. This would not have applied to countries with acceptable carbon reduction regimes in place.
251. Cf Council Directive 2009/29, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63 (EC).
252. Cf IKENBERRY, supra note 100, at 113. See also Scott & Rajamani, supra note 6, at 483
(discussing that "equivalent" may have multiple meanings, but that "third country measures are
required to achieve an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of the directive" and that "the
emphasis upon equivalence would seem to suggest that equal treatment, not differentiation, will be the
guiding principle in this respect.").
253. See Julia Pyper, U.S. Lawmakers, State Dept. to Escalate Opposition to E.U. Emissions
Scheme, CLIMATEWIRE, July 31, 2012, at 3.
254. With odd sort of reasoning, Advocate General Kokott opined that the Aviation Directive did
not pose a threat to the sovereignty of non-EU member states by regulating aviation emissions over
their territories because it did not preclude third countries from bringing into effect or applying their
own emissions trading schemes for aviation activities. See Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 156.
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economic activity within the Common Market, notwithstanding the fact that a bulk
of that economic activity may occur outside the EU.255
Finally, as noted, under the Aviation Directive the EU retains authority to
pass on the efficacy of aviation-based climate change policies initiated in third
states. The Aviation Directive accomplishes this by empowering the Commission
to grant waivers to third-country air carriers based upon the quality of a country's
aviation carbon reduction efforts. It also deploys certain economic tools to support
the waiver system-such as granting or withdrawing landing rights. This waiver
system is, in effect, an approval system. That is, the granting of a waiver is the
equivalent of the EU placing its imprimatur on a third country's aviation emission
reduction efforts. Conversely, the Commission's refusal to grant a waiver is a de
facto judgment that a third country's aviation carbon reduction efforts do not pass
EU muster. Not only does the Aviation Directive project a regulatory system onto
third parties, but it pulls into the Brussels' bureaucracy the assessment of third-
country efforts in this area. Whether the Commission ultimately uses this power is
an open question. The fact that the EU uses its own treaties and regulations to
confer upon itself certain comprehensive powers provides important insight into
states' responses to the impact of transnational problems, 256 here with regard to
effectively globalizing one aspect of the EU's environmental regulatory authority.
B. Managing State and Global Conduct by Reshaping Individual Behavior
Traditionally the authority of a state to regulate the behaviors of persons
(legal and natural) within its borders free from outside interference has been
255. Some might argue that the EU's aviation direction is no different from other aviation
regulatory schemes imposed by other states such as, for example, the U.S. requirement of 100 percent
cargo screening for inbound flights regardless of origin. The Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 380, 478 [hereinafter The
Implementing Recommendations]. Does that requirement not constitute extraterritorial regulation of
economic activity that occurs elsewhere? To some extent the answer is "yes." However, the Aviation
Directive is distinguishable in one important sense. The formula that was developed to calculate the
amount of fees to be paid through the purchase of carbon credits clearly enables both generators and
non-EU states to distinguish between locations of economic activity, such as in a non-EU state and over
international airspace. Thus, unlike the 100 percent cargo screening requirement or many airport
landing fees, the Aviation Directive imposes a financial charge on carbon generating economic activity
attributable to a particular flight even when much of that economic activity occurs outside the EU. As
discussed, the reason for this approach was to (1) mitigate a potential carbon leakage problem, and (2)
protect EU-based airlines from economic distortions associated with compliance. This does not alter the
fact, however, that a non-EU registered airline landing or departing from a Member State is subject to
the regulatory effects of the ETS and must ostensibly pay a fee based upon the length of flight (that is,
total fuel consumed) to the assigned Member State for its total carbon generating economic activity
regardless of where it physically occurs.
256. See, e.g., TFEU, supra note 200, arts. 3, 191, 192. Cf Commission Proposal for a Directive of
the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 1999/32/EC as Regards the Sulphur
Content of Marine Fuels, at 4, COM (2011) 439 final (July 15, 2011) (explaining that EU authority to
regulate sulphur content of marine bunker fuels stems from IMO regulations and authority granted to it
by the TFEU).
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considered sacrosanct in international relations. 257  Although the so-called
"American Doctrine" 258 has at times recognized extraterritorial application of
municipal laws, most states have resisted its broad adoption in the absence of
treaty or customary obligations. 259 Even U.S. courts have been hesitant to grant
wide transnational application to domestic laws and regulations. 260 The extent to
which one state may extend its domestic authority into the affairs of another state
is, however, a question with liquid results. Ian Brownlie notes that, "[t]he present
position is probably this: a state has enforcement jurisdiction abroad only to the
extent necessary to enforce its legislative jurisdiction" based primarily on the
principle of "substantial connection." 261 Under assumed principles of public
international law, an extraterritorial act can only be legal if: (1) there is a
substantial and bona fide connection between the regulated act, the subject matter,
and the jurisdiction; (2) the principle of non-intervention is observed; and (3)
accommodation, mutuality and proportionality are followed.262
But this is only "probably" the law and as Halpin and Roeben note,
globalization gives broad artistic legal license to states and lawmakers.
Limitations on the extraterritorial extension of municipal law are fluid because
international law is a creation of actors (state and now non-state) imbued with wide
discretion 263 juxtaposed by narrow accountability for their actual regulatory
choices. 26 By defining the notion of "substantial and bona fide connection"
narrowly or broadly, the most influential states can restrict or expand the
application of their municipal law to individuals and activities in other states. The
257. But see Jaye Ellis, Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International Law, 25
LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 313, 324 n. 74 (2012) ("[lIt once appeared self-evident that state sovereignty implied
a right of the sovereign to define and pursue domestic policy goals without interference from other
states. This interpretation of sovereignty remains highly persuasive and pervasive, but has lost its self-
evidence.").
258. Brownlie, supra note 45, at 309.
259. P.M. Roth, Reasonable Extraterritoriality: Correcting the "Balance of Interests," 41 INT'L
COMP. L. Q. 245, 251 (1992).
260. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 123 (1825) (the courts of no country execute the penal
laws of another); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249 (1991) (rejecting the EEOC's
position that Title VII applies extraterritorially to regulate employment practices of U.S. employers
employing American citizens abroad); Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878, 2881
(2010) (rejecting the "conduct and effects" tests relying upon the default presumption against
extraterritorial application of American laws abroad, absent express statutory designation).
261. Brownlie, supra note 45, at 311 (emphasis added).
262. Id. at 311-12.
263. See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 21 (May 28) [hereinafter Genocide Advisory Opinion] ("It
is well established that in its treaty relations a State cannot be bound without its consent, and that
consequently no reservation can be effective against any State without its agreement thereto.").
264. See, e.g., Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Rights Body Condemns Syria Over Violations, REUTERS,
Mar. 1, 2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/uk-syria-rights-idUKTRE82001220120301. See
also Cedric Ryngaert, The European Court of Human Rights' Approach to the Responsibility of
Member States in Connection with Acts of International Organizations, 60 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 997, 997
(2011) (discussing the lack of member state responsibility for actions of international organizations).
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expanding list of transnational problems in such areas as climate change, 265
security,266 and finance267 actually serve to incentivize states to see substantial
connections where none existed before,268 or even undertake the unilateral
enforcement of the "collective will," whatever that may mean. 269  In short, for
regulatory purposes it is increasingly difficult to tease apart purely domestic
behavior from the purely transnational behavior, given their interconnectedness.270
But the Aviation Directive illustrates more than the expanding notion of
substantial connection between external behavior and domestic state interests. It
also illustrates the emerging tendency of the most influential states to achieve
certain policy objectives by circumventing frozen multilateral apparatuses and
going directly after the extraterritorial conduct of individuals. Globalization has
arguably created the "virtual citizen" living in multiple legal spheres and subject
directly and indirectly to a virtual system of legal regimes, some of which operate
completely beyond the borders of a particular state. Such regimes seek to alter
global behavior by attaching directly to individual conduct regardless of where it
265. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35,1124-29, 33.
266. See Christopher C. Joyner, Countering Nuclear Terrorism: A Conventional Response, 18 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 225, 225-26 (2007) (discussing the threat of nuclear terrorism to international security).
267. In addition to issues concerning the environment and climate change, the 2008 financial crisis
encouraged further extraterritorial regulation of the global financial industry given the transnational
effects of that crisis. For example, the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission ("CTFC") has
proposed that as part of its implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act's swap rules the term "U.S. person"
be interpreted "by reference to the extent to which swap activities or transactions involving one or more
such person has relevant effect on U.S. commerce." Press Release, CFTC Approves Proposed
Interpretive Guidance on Cross-Border Application of the Swaps Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
(June 29, 2012) (emphasis added), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6293-12. This
results from provisions within the Dodd-Frank Act that apply to activities that "have a direct and
significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States . . . ."
Commodities Exchange Act, § (i)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2, amended by Pub. L. No. 111-203 §722(d)(i)(1)
(2010). Although the CTFC does not require foreign governments, central banks or international
financial institutions to register, it is clear that Dodd-Frank and the CTFC's interpretation of its powers
are meant to cast a wider transnational net over certain financial transactions that have effects on the
U.S. economy. For further definition of "Swap Dealer," "Security-Based Swap Dealer," "Major Swap
Participant," "Major Security-Based Swap Participant" and "Eligible Contract Participant," see 77 Fed.
Reg. 30596, 30693 (May 23, 2012).
268. See also Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting
that CERCLA expresses clear intent by Congress to remedy domestic conditions within U.S. even from
extraterritorial sources thus justifying the extraterritorial application of CERCLA in some cases). See,
e.g., Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application ofAmerican Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A
Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 750, 755-56 (1995).
269. See Nico Krisch, Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq and the Security
Council, 3 MAX PLUNK Y.B. U.N.L. 59, 60 (1999) (discussing the evolution of a new right of states to
take unilateral action to enforce the perceived collective will when multilateral enforcement efforts
fail).
270. See e.g., Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Reducing the Climate
Change Impact of Aviation, at 4, COM (2005) 459 final (Sept. 27, 2005) (stating that "international
aviation should be included in any post-2012 climate change regime to give States stronger incentives
to take action.").
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occurs on the planet and with decreasing respect for the notion of total state
sovereignty. The extraterritorial application of municipal law becomes a
convenient and largely unchecked method for shaping global behaviors ranging
everywhere from how tuna are caught on the high seas,27' to how the internet is
used,272 to how the world is reducing its carbon footprint,273 to overseeing
corporate activity,274 to provincial concerns over national security.275
The Aviation Directive is not simply an attempt to highlight a growing global
problem or regulate a specific market activity. It is rather an attempt at behavior
modification par excellence; 276 a behavior modification exercise in which the EU
extends its municipal authority beyond the notion of the state to a virtual world of
substantially connected behavior in an attempt to alter global conduct by
individuals and companies,277 while protecting its domestic interests from the
adverse consequences of its own policy choices. Transnational certification
regimes can serve a similar purpose.278 The Aviation Directive seeks to achieve
the dual goals of attacking climate change and protecting domestic economic
interests by incentivizing alternative behavior making existing behavior more
expensive to continue while capitalizing on the effort. 279  If airlines must buy
carbon credits and the cost of carbon increases, passengers are more likely to
demand greater efficiency and innovation in the delivery of aviation services if for
no other reason than to reduce associated expenses. And, if the EU is ahead of the
271. See, e.g., Marine Mammals Protection Act, supra note 9, § 111(c).
272. See e.g., R v. Re the MARITIM Trade Mark, [2003] I.L. Pr. 17, 297 (Hamburg Dist. Ct.)
(Ger.) (holding that under German law, a tort occurs any place where the internet domain can be called
up regardless of the physical location of the domain).
273. See e.g., Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 16.
274. See, e.g., Anti-monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/PO20071012533593
599575.pdf (declaring law shall apply extraterritorially based on effects); The U.K. Bribery Act 2010,
2010 c. 23 (2010) (extending UK bribery law to third counties).
275. See e.g., The Implementing Recommendations, supra note 255 (requiring 100 percent cargo
scanning in foreign ports). One additional area of emerging concern regards income taxation. With the
globalization of capital, investments and profits, the sources of income for taxation purposes diversify.
See Nolan Cormac Sharkey, International Tax as International Law and the Impact of China, 3 BRIT.
TAX REV. 269, 270 (2012).
276. According to the ICAO, "[t]he airlines of ... 191 Member States carried approximately 2.7
billion passengers in 2011, showing an increase of about 5.6 per cent over 2010. The number of
departures on scheduled services reached 30.1 million globally in 2011 compared to 29 million in
2010." Int'l Civil Aviation Org., Annual Report of the Council 1 (2011), available at
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/9975_en.pdf. See also Aviation Directive, supra note 2,
15 ("Aircraft operators have the most direct control over the type of aircraft in operation and the way in
which they are flown.. . .").
277. Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 1 147.
278. Cf Kristin L. Stewart, Dolphin-Safe Tuna: The Tide is Changing, 4 ANIMAL L. 111, 118
(1998) (discussing the "Dolphin-Safe Tuna" certification).
279. See, e.g., Air Transport Case, supra note 35, 140 ("In particular, by allowing the allowances
... to be sold, the scheme is intended to encourage every participant in the scheme to emit quantities of
greenhouse gases that are less than the allowances originally allocated to him.").
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pack in altering its behavior and transforming its economy, better for its citizens
and its future economic prospects.
The unilateral application of the Aviation Directive, therefore, targets a broad
swath of persons by penalizing existing behavior and incentivizing alternative
behavior. By extending the ETS to global aviation, the EU effectively seeks to
drive-up the financial costs of current global carbon generating behavior (not by
aircraft but by people); encourage other states to take climate change more
seriously; establish its carbon trading market as a central tool in global emissions
reduction efforts; meet its international climate change obligations by globalizing
those obligations; and protect its own internal markets from the potentially
distorting effects of its climate change policies while simultaneously encouraging
innovation. Aircraft are not merely static objects of metal, plastic and rubber.
They exist for a functional purpose and that is to transport people and goods.
The Aviation Directive's individual behavior-focused approach to addressing
global climate change, as distinguished from a formal state-to-state focused
approach typically associated with multilateralism, has two advantages: (1) it
bypasses external political barriers, such as the inconvenience of multilateral
agreements or intransigence of other states; and (2) it enables the EU to protect its
own domestic policies and objectives. 280 It also has the potential of sparking a
significant trade war in response to a perception of EU overreach, thus
encouraging other states to take equally broad unilateral actions in other areas of
transnational concern.
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout history influential states have sought to shape global relations and
global behavior beyond their immediate borders often through conquest and
colonization. In more recent years, law has become an important tool in achieving
political and economic objectives, and protecting domestic interests from global
forces. The Aviation Directive evidences that while many global problems need
multilateral solutions, those same problems can incentivize states to act unilaterally
by extending their municipal laws into the virtual spaces of transnational conduct
created by globalization. 281 Yet the EU's unilateral efforts at addressing climate
change and other environment concerns do more than demonstrate developments
and paradoxes within the field of international law. It demonstrates three
important points about the globe's legal order. First, the extension of the ETS to
global aviation demonstrates that notwithstanding efforts by Western states over
280. Danielle Goodwin, Aviation, Climate Change and the European Union's Emissions Trading
Scheme, 6 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 742, 744, 748 (2008); Mark Stallworthy, New Forms of Carbon
Accounting: The Significance of a Climate Change Act for Economic Activity in the United Kingdom,
18 INT'L CO. & COMM. L. REV. 331, 331 (2007). See also Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 15 (noting
air carriers "have the most direct control over the type of aircraft in operation and the way in which they
are flown.").
281. See, e.g., Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 16 ("In order to avoid distortions of competition
and improve environmental effectiveness, emissions from all flights arriving at and departing from
Community aerodromes should be included from 2012."). See also sources cited, supra note 9.
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the last sixty years to promote multilateralism as the favored tool for solving global
problems, these same states can still be driven by domestic concerns to act
unilaterally when it suits them, given their vast reserves of political, economic and
cultural power. As non-economic matters such as climate change, national
security, and transnational crime emerge on the same plane as economics they
become powerful incentives for unilateralism and extraterritoriality. In short,
when multilateralism fails, the world's most powerful states are not rendered
powerless in shaping global behavior.
Second, the Aviation Directive demonstrates that in a world defined by
substantial connectedness, influential states have the power to shape global
behavior by regulating individual conduct regardless of where a person or entity
may be physically located on the planet. The Aviation Directive is not simply
about regulating economic activity. It is fundamentally about reshaping global
behavior by using municipal laws to incentivize behavior change across the world.
Aircraft operators have the most direct control over the type of aircraft
in operation and the way in which they are flown and should therefore
be responsible for complying with the obligations imposed by this
Directive, including the obligation to prepare a monitoring plan and ...
to report emissions in accordance with that plan. 282
Global interdependencies will demand greater multilateral cooperation and yet
encourage states to use extraterritorial legal powers to regulate individual behavior
elsewhere regardless of the limitations imposed by conventional notions of the
state.283 The idea of the "virtual individual" subject to the virtual regulatory power
of states is replacing the idea that an individual is tied to a time and place in order
to define the limit of state authority. 284
Finally, the Aviation Directive points to the fact that notwithstanding a desire
to define the normative parameters of public international law-always a
questionably successful exercise-globalization is not only contributing to subject
matter fragmentation, but more importantly, source fragmentation.285 What is to
be made of the Aviation Directive, the Dodd-Frank Act, or India's amended
Competition Law on the spectrum of law? Are they examples of purely municipal
law? Are they examples of a new form of international law? Are they hybrids of
282. Aviation Directive, supra note 2, 15.
283. But see Wheatley, supra note 233.
284. Suzanne A. Spears, The Quest for Policy Space in a New Generation of International
Investment Agreements, 13 J. INT'L ECON L. 1037, 1038 (2010).
285. See, e.g., Jos6 E. Alvarez & Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again:
The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 102 (2002). See Michael S. Barr &
Geoffrey Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 17 (2006)
(critiquing lawmaking by networks of bank regulators and international bureaucrats in the Basel Accord
as lacking accountability and legitimacy, but arguing that Basel II is subject to a subtle structure of
international administrative law). See also Meredith Crowley & Robert Howse, US-Stainless Steel
(Mexico), 9 WORLD TRADE REV. 117, 148 (2010); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and
Global Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE 611, 612 (2005); Andrea Hamann & H616ne Ruiz Fabri,
Transnational Networks and Constitutionalism, 6 INT'L J. CONsT. L. 481, 48 1-82 (2008).
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both? While these examples are arguably not "international law" in the strictest,
most conventional sense of that term, each is nevertheless designed to shape
international behavior, to redefine the relationship of the individual to the state,
and to project a municipal regulatory system across the globe. Thus, in spite of
efforts over the last sixty years to transform international law from a coordinating
exercise into a cooperation exercise, it is still the product of a segmented society.
It is defined by the will of each segment to cooperate and capability of its more
influential segments to "go it alone" when cooperation fails. To ignore this fact is
to ignore one of the most important and understudied developments in
international law: the power of some states to rebuff multilateralism when
unilateralism provides a more effective and expedient approach to transnational
problem-solving. As transnational problems grow in breadth, number, and speed
of effect, the incentive for some states to shape global behavior-and therefore
international law through the unilateral use of municipal law-will be an attractive
alternative to multilateralism, claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

